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Executive Summary 
The United States' civil space program was 
rather hurriedly formulated some three decades ago 
on the heels of the successful launch of the Soviet 
Sputnik. A dozen humans have been placed on the 
Moon and safel' returned to Earth, seven of the 
other eight planets have been viewed at close range, 
including the soft landing of two robot spacecraft on 
Mars, and a variety of significant astronomical and 
other scientific observations have been accom-
plished. Closer to Earth, a network of communica-
tions satellites has been established, weather and 
ocean conditions are now monitored and reported as 
they occur, and the Earth's surface is observed from 
space to study natural resources and detect sources 
of pollution. 
PrIilc;iis and Ptrspt'cti pes. In spite of these virtually 
unparalleled achievements, the civil space program 
and its principal agent, the National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration, arc today the subject of 
considerable criticism. The source of this criticism 
ranges from concern over technical capability to the 
complexity of major space projects; from the ability 
to estimate and control costs to the growth of 
bureaucracy; and from a perceived lack of an overall 
space plan to an alleged institutional resistance to 
new ideas and change. The failure of the Chal-
lenger, the recent hydrogen leaks on several Space 
Shuttle orbiters, the spherical aberration problem 
encountered with the Hubble Space Telescope, and 
various launch processing errors such as a work 
platform left in an engine compartment and discov-
ered during launch preparations, have all heightened 
this dissatisfaction. 
Some of the concern is, in the view of the 
Committee, deserved and occasionally even self-
inflicted. For example, the practice of separately 
reporting the cost of space missions according to 
accounting categories (which for bookkeeping 
purposes allocates launch services to a distinct 
account) results in confusion as to what is the actual 
cost of a mission. 
Yet, in spite of recognized current problems, 
care must also he taken not to impose potentially 
disruptive remedies on today's NASA to correct 
problems that existed in an earlier NASA. The 
much publicized spherical aberration problem of the 
Hubble Space Telescope encountered this past year 
is in fact a consequence of an assembl y error left 
undiscovered in tests conducted a decade ago - in 
1980. The decision to launch the Challenger in 
cold weather, when the seals between rocket motor
segments would be most suspect, took place five 
years ago and has spurred NASA to many manage-
ment changes. Since the Challenger accident, NASA 
has increased the emphasis on safety, and has borne 
the burden of delaying launches when reasonable 
questions arose over the readiness to launch safely. 
On the other hand, processing incidents during 
launch preparation continue to occur in NASA 
operations, and to be the cause of justifiable con-
cern.
Because of the intense interest in - and 
scrutiny of— America's commendably open and 
visible civil space program, it is sometimes easy to 
overlook the fact that technical problems such as 
hydrogen leaks, faulty seals and erroneous assembly 
procedures are not unique to today's space activities, 
or even to NASA. Although problems of any sort 
are most emphatically not to be condoned, when 
comparing today's space program with the successes 
of the past, it must also be recalled that America's 
first attempt to launch an Earth satellite using the 
Vanguard rocket ended in failure. By the end of 
1959, 37 satellite launches had been attempted: less 
than one-third attained orbit. Ten of the first eleven 
launches of unmanned probes to the Moon to 
obtain precursor data in support of the Apollo 
mission failed. Three astronauts were lost in a fire 
aboard the Apollo capsule during ground testing. A 
cryogenic storage tank exploded during the mission 
of Apollo 13 en route to the Moon, seriously 
damaging the spacecraft. During the few months 
surrounding the Challenger accident, a Delta, an 
Atlas-Centaur, two Titan 34-D's, a French Ariane-2 
and a Soviet Proton were all lost. 
Space missions, whether manned or unmanned, 
are fundamentally difficult and demanding undertak-
ings that depend upon some of the world's most 
advanced technology. The Saturn V rocket required 
the integration of some six million components 
manufactured by thousands of separate contractors. 
Voyager 2 arrived at Neptune a mere one second 
behind its final updated schedule after a 12- year, 4.4 
billion mile flight, approaching within 3,000 miles of 
the planet's surface. The information to be gathered 
by the Earth Observing System could approach 10 
trillion bits of information - about one Librar y of 
Congress - per da y. The matter of human frailty is 
perhaps of even greater import: in the case of the 
Apollo program, some 400,000 people at some 
20,000 locations were involved in its design, test and 
operation.
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Concerns. Nonetheless, given the cost of space 
activities, in both financial and human terms, and 
their profound impact on America's prestige 
throughout the world, no goal short of perfection is 
acceptable. The Committee finds that there are a 
number of concerns about the civil space program 
and NASA which are deserving of attention. 
The first of these is the lack of a national 
consensus as to what should be the goals of the civil 
space program and how they should in fact be 
accomplished. It seems that most Americans do 
support a viable space program for the nation	 but 
no two individuals seem able to agree upon what 
that space program should be. Further, those 
immediately involved in the program often seem 
least inclined to compromise for the common good. 
Some point out that most space missions can be 
performed with robots for a fraction of the cost of 
humans, and that, therefore, the manned space 
program should be curtailed. Others point out that 
the involvement of humans is the very essence of 
exploration, and that only humans can fully adapt to 
the unexpected. Some point to the need for acceler-
ated commercialization of space while others argue 
the benefits of fundamental science - onl y to be 
challenged in turn to prove the tangible value 
of studies in astronomy. 
Second, and closely related to this contentious 
yet fundamental matter, our Committee believes 
that NASA is currently over committed in terms of 
program obligations relative to resources available - 
in short, it is trying to do too much, and allowing 
too little margill for the unexpected. As a result, 
there is the frequent need to revamp major pro-
grams, which in turn sometimes results in forcing 
smaller (scientific) pursuits to pay the bill for 
problems encountered in larger (frequently manned) 
missions. Of major importance, in our view, is the 
fact that margins needed to provide confidence in 
maintaining cost, schedule, performance, and 
especially reliability, too often are minimal or absent. 
Third, continuing changes in project budgets, 
sometimes exacerbated by actions needed to extri-
cate projects from technical difficulties, result in 
management inefficiencies. These demoralize and 
frustrate the individuals pursuing those projects - 
as well as those who must pay the bills. 
Fourth, there is the matter of institutional aging 
and the concern that NASA has not been sufficiently 
responsive to valid criticism and to the need for 
change.
Fifth, the personnel policies embodied in the 
civil service system are, in the opinion of the Com-
mittee, hopelessly incompatible with the long term 
maintenance of a leading-edge, aggressive, confi-
dent, and able work force of technical specialists and 
technically trained managers that will be needed by 
NASA in the years ahead. 
Sixth, it is a natural tendency for projects to 
grow in scope, complexity, and cost. Deliberate 
steps must be taken to guard against this phenom-
enon if programs are not to collapse under their 
own weight - often, as already noted, taking a toll 
on the smaller projects that must share in the 
budget. 
Seventh, the material foundation of any major 
space project is its "technological base." It is this 
base that produces the key building blocks, or 
"enablers," that make major missions possible - 
new materials, electronics, engines and the like. The 
technology base of NASA has now been starved for 
well over a decade and must be rebuilt if a sound 
underpinning is to be regained for future space 
missions. 
Eighth, space projects tend to be very 
unforgiving of any form of neglect or human failing 
- particularly with respect to engineering discipline. 
Spacecraft incorporating flaws are not readily 
"recalled" to the factory for modification. It is this 
category of problem that has evoked much of the 
criticism directed at NASA in recent years, although 
with new technology there are growing opportuni-
ties for systems that are "self-healing." 
Finally, ninth, the civil space program is overly 
dependent upon the Space Shuttle for access to 
space. The Space Shuttle offers significant capabili-
ties to carry out missions where humans are 
uniquely required	 as has been the case on a 
number of occasions. The Shuttle is also a complex 
system that has yet to demonstrate an ability to 
adhere to a fixed schedule. And although it is a 
subject that meets with reluctance to open discus-
sion, and has therefore too often been relegated to 
silence, the statistical evidence indicates that we are 
likely to lose another Space Shuttle in the next 
several years ... probably before the planned Space 
Station is completely established on orbit. This 
would seem to be the weak link of the civil space 
program - unpleasant to recognize, involving all 
the uncertainties of statistics, and difficult to resolve. 
The Space Shuttle differs in important ways 
from unmanned vehicles. On the positive side it 
provides the flexibility and capability attendant to 
human presence and it permits the recovery of costly 
launch vehicle hardware which would otherwise be 
expended. On the negative side, it tends to be
complex, with relatively limited margins; it has not 
realized the promised cost savings; and should it fail 
catastrophically, it takes with it a substantial portion 
of the nation's future manned launch capability and, 
potentially, several human lives. 
The Committee recognizes the important role 
of the Space Shuttle for missions where there is the 
need for human involvement, and notes that the 
Space Shuttle is absolutely essential to America's civil 
space program for the next decade or more. Neces-
sary steps to assure the viability of Space Shuttle 
operations in this decade should therefore proceed. 
Nonetheless, the Committee believes, in hindsight, 
that it was, for example, inappropriate in the case of 
Challenger to risk the lives of seven astronauts and 
nearly one-fourth of NASA's launch assets to place 
in orbit a communications satellite. 
Age;icRespwzsiLiiliti ' Against the backdrop of 
these and other concerns, the Committee was asked 
to consider whether some altogether new form of 
management structure should be established to 
pursue portions of the nation's civil space program, 
as has been recommended by various observers. 
Such a model might include an altogether separate 
agency patterned after, say, the Strategic Defense 
Initiative Organization of the Department of 
Defense, which would be established to pursue 
major new initiatives such as the Mars exploration 
program. Another possibility occasionally proposed 
is to separate the Space Shuttle's operation from 
NASA so as to permit the space agency to focus 
upon the pursuit of advanced technology and new 
leading-edge missions. 
The conclusion of the Committee is that 
changes of such sweeping scope are inappropriate. 
First, in spite of imperfections, by far the greatest 
body of space expertise in any single organization in 
the world resides within NASA. Further, in the case 
of Space Shuttle operations, the maturity of the 
system is neither compatible with a (potentially 
disruptive) shift to a new operator nor, in the 
opinion of the Committee, is it ever likely to be - 
even though in principle we favor private sector 
operations over government operations whenever 
practicable. NASA and its predecessor, NACA, have 
followed this practice with regard to the aeronautics 
program - producing unmatched technology that 
helped make America's commercial aircraft industry 
preeminent in the world. A similar effort is needed 
with respect to space activities - but the Space 
Shuttle is not, in our opinion, the correct mecha-
nism for accomplishing this objective.
Briefly stated, the Committee believes that 
NASA, and only NASA, realistically possesses the 
essential critical mass of knowledge and expertise 
upon which thè'nation's civil space program can be 
sustained - and that the task at hand is therefore for 
NASA to focus on making the self-improvements 
that gird this responsibility. 
1 /rt 
-lj7 ,iIa The question then arises: "What 
should be the U.S. space program?" Although it 
may be tempting to lay out an accelerated plan to 
accomplish the unaccomplished and to attack the 
unknown, to do so in the absence of fiscal and 
technical realism would be a disservice, and would 
only magnify the problem of management "turbu-
lence" that already has been so costly to the space 
effort - both in money and morale. 
The question thus becomes one of what can and 
should the U.S. afford for its civil space endeavors in 
a time of unarguably great demands right here on 
Earth, ranging from reducing the deficit to curing 
disease and from improving education to eliminating 
poverty. The answer to this question is made all the 
more difficult because the space program touches so 
many aspects of our lives and contributes to the 
accomplishment of goals ranging from improving 
education to enhancing our standard of living and 
from assuring national security to strengthening 
communications among the peoples of the world. 
The space program produces technology that 
enhances competitiveness; the largest rise and 
subsequent decline in the nation's output of much 
needed science and engineering talent in recent 
decades coincided with, and some say may have been 
motivated by, the build-up and subsequent phase-
down in the civil space program. 
Global understanding has been enhanced 
through the establishment of widespread satellite 
telecommunications. Countless lives and consider-
able property have been saved through advanced 
weather forecasting and the use of spaceborne search 
and rescue systems. Basic scientific knowledge has 
been obtained that addresses such important ques-
tions as why one planet evolves to become altogether 
uninhabitable, while another nurtures life. 
It can be argued that at least some of these 
benefits can be reaped by other more direct means. 
If the objective is to stimulate education, then why 
not give the money being spent on space to our 
schools? If the objective is to study the stars, then 
why not build more and better telescopes here on 
Earth? To ease poverty, give aid to those in need. 
Yet perhaps the most important space benefit of all is 
intangible - the uplifting of spirits and human pride 
in response to truly great accomplishments -
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whether they be the sight of a single human orbiting 
Report vfrht' freely around the Earth at 18,000 miles per hour, or 
a picture of Uranus' moon Miranda transmitted 1.7 
Advison billion miles through space, and taking some 2-1/2 
hours merely to arrive at our listening stations even 
Committee - when traveling literally at the speed of light. Such 
on the accomplishments have served to unite our nation, 
hold our attention, and inspire us all, particularly 
Future of the our youth, as few other events have done in the 
history of our nation or even the world. 
U.S. Space Our Committee concludes that America does 
Proqrani want an energetic, affordable and successful space 
program, a predilection to which we as individuals 
unabashedly confess. This support has been evi-
denced in the gradual growth in space funding for 
nearly two decades (Figure 1). The question 
remains, however, "What should we afford?" In this 
regard, a historical perspective is helpful. At its 
peak, during the Apollo years, America spent 0.8 
percent of its gross national product on its civil space 
program (Figure 2). This level amounted to about 
4.5 percent of federal spending at the time (Figure 
3) and, perhaps more importantly, about 6 percent 
of the discretionary portion of the federal budget 
(Figure 4). Today, we as a nation are spending 
about one-third of the Apollo peak spending as a 
portion of the GNP	 and the fraction of the 
increasingly pressured total discretionary budget has 
declined to 2.5 percent. 
Presumably reflecting public support, both the 
Executive Branch and the Congress have recently 
shown a willingness to increase civil space spending 
on the order of 10 percent per year (real growth) for 
a well-executed program. This, therefore, is the 
baseline selected by this Committee to assure at least 
a first order fiscal test in our proposals. A larger 
budget would obviously permit a more energetic 
space program - while the converse also is true. 
We recommend an approach which can accommo-
date, within limits, either contingency. Our specific 
assumption is that the civil space budget will grow 
by approximately 10 percent per year in real dollars 
throughout most of this decade, leveling out at 
about 0.4 percent of the GNP. This is a budget that 
can enable a strong space program	 but only if 
funding is predictable and programs are carefully 
managed and consistently executed. As a reference, 
civil space spending recently approved for 1991 
represented 8.5 percent real growth over the prior 
year's spending. 
In defining a space agenda we believe it is not 
sufficient merely to list a collection of projects to be 
undertaken in space, no matter how meritorious 
each may be. It is essential to provide a logical basis 
for the structure of the program, including a sense 
4
of priorities.
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:1 Ba In ii ccii \pn cc i'i -vjjrani. It is our belief that the 
space science program warrants highest priority for 
funding. It, in our judgment, ranks above space 
stations, aerospace planes, manned missions to the 
planets, and many other major pursuits which often 
receive greater visibility. It is-this endeavor in 
science that enables basic discovery and understand-
ing, that uncovers the fundamental knowledge of 
our own planet to improve the quality of life for all 
people on Earth, and that stimulates the education 
of the scientists needed for the future. Science gives 
vision, imagination, and direction to the space 
program, and as such should be vigorously protected 
and permitted to grow, holding at or somewhat 
above its present fraction of NASA's budget even as 
the overall space budget grows. 
Having thus established the science activity as 
the fulcrum of the entire civil space effort, we would 
then recommend the "mission-oriented" portion of 
the program be designcd to support two major 
undertakings: a Mission to Planet Earth and a 
Mission from Planet Earth. Both, we believe, are of 
considerable importance. The Mission to Planet 
Earth, as we would define it, is the undertaking that 
in fact brings space down to Earth
	 addressing 
critical, everyday problems which affect all the 
Earth's peoples. While we emphasize the need for a 
balanced space program, it is the Mission to Planet 
Earth which connotes sonic degree of urgency. 
Mission to Planet Earth, as we would define it, 
comprises a series of Earth-observing satellites, 
probes and related instruments, and a complemen-
tary data handling system aimed at producing a 
much clearer understanding of global climate change 
and the impact of human activities on Earth's 
biosphere. This effort will provide us with a much 
better understanding of our environment, how we 
may be affecting it, and what might he done to 
restore it. 
The Mission from Planet Earth is principally, but 
not exclusively, focused upon the exploration of 
space. This is where most of the manned space 
undertakings are to he pursued and as such this 
tends to be the most costly aspect of the civil space 
program. 
Today, America's manned space program is at a 
crossroads. The Committee believes that a focus 
must be given to this program now if it is not merely 
to drift through the decade ahead. Although there is 
no particular timetable that can in good conscience 
be assigned to this pursuit, it nonetheless sorely 
needs agreement as to direction. 
At least in part because of its cost, the manned 
space program has been at the vent hub of contro-
versy swirling around the nation's civil space activity.
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It can be argued that much of what humans can 
perform in space could be conducted at less cost and 
risk with robotic spacecraft - and in many instances 
we believe it should be. 
But are there not activities in space which 
properly should be the province of human intelli-
gence, flexibility and being? The Committee found 
it instructive in this regard to ask whether we would 
be content with a space program that involved no 
human flight. Our answer is a resounding "no." 
There is a difference between Hillary reaching the 
top of Everest and merely using a rocket to loft an 
instrument package to the summit. There is a 
difference between the now largely forgotten Soviet 
robotic Moon explorer that itself returned lunar 
samples, and the exploits of astronauts Neil 
Armstrong, Buzz Aldrin, and Mike Collins. The 
Committee thus wholeheartedly endorses a far-
reaching, but we believe realistic, undertaking in 
manned space activity, carefully paced to the avail-
ability of funds. 
But if there is to be a manned space undertak-
ing, what should it be? Surely the goal is not merely 
to provide routine transportation of cargo to and 
from space. In this regard, we share the view of the 
President that the long term magnet for the manned 
space program is the planet Mars - the human 
exploration of Mars, to he specific. It needs to be 
stated straightforwardly that such an undertaking 
probably must be justified largely on the basis of 
intangibles	 the desire to explore, to learn about 
one's surroundings, to challenge the unknown and 
to find what is to be found. Surely such an endeavor 
must be preceded by further unmanned visits, and 
by taking certain important steps along the way, 
including returning for extended periods to the 
Moon in order to refine our hardware and proce-
dures and to develop the skills and technologies 
required for long term planetary living. 
The Committee offers what we believe to be a 
potentially significant new approach in the planning 
of human space exploration. Although we appreci-
ate the arguments for setting a "date certain" for 
many or even most of our space goals, as did 
President Kennedy with respect to going to the 
Moon, we believe that a program with the ultimate, 
long term objective of human exploration of Mars 
should be tailored to respond to the availability of 
funding, rather than to adhering to a rigid schedule. 
This does not demean the importance of the 
manned space program, but rather is a consequence 
of the fact that we simply cannot know with any 
exactness the cost or obstacles which may impede a 
Mars mission. We do know that, whatever the cost 
is, it can be spread over many years, and that it will
have to endure the changing emphasis of a series of 
Presidents and Congresses as well as of economic 
circumstances. We also believe that this is a 
challenge that could be constructively shared among 
a number of nations. The challenge, from a man-
agement standpoint, is to tailor a program, the first 
step of which is to generate needed technology 
building-blocks, which can adapt to the availability 
of funds. The availability of funding would then 
determine mission schedule	 because the converse 
is neither economically nor politically practical. 
Unforeseen fiscal demands would be borne by the 
program itself rather than off-loaded to other 
important but smaller (science) programs. 
Using this management approach, the Commit-
tee believes that a sound, long term human explora-
tion program can be pursued. It provides an 
important companion to Mission to Planet Earth 
and clearly states America's intention to stay in space 
with humans. 
But fundamental uncertainties remain with 
respect to the feasibility of long duration human 
space flight, uncertainties that revolve around the 
effects of solar flares, muscle deterioration due to 
weightlessness, the loss of calcium in human bone 
structure, and the impact of galactic cosmic radia-
tion. These basic issues need to be resolved before 
undertaking vast projects	 by means of long 
duration operations involving humans in space. We 
thus arrive at what we believe is the fundamental 
reason for building a space station: to gain the 
much needed life sciences information and experi-
ence in long duration space operations. Such 
information is vital if America is not to abdicate its 
role in manned space flight. 
We do not believe that the Space Station 
Freedom, as we now know it, can be justified solely 
on the basis of the (non-biological) science it can 
perform, much of which can be conducted on Earth 
or by robotic spacecraft for less cost. Similarly, we 
doubt that the Space Station will be essential as a 
transportation mode 	 certainly not for many years. 
However, the Space Station is deemed essential as a 
life sciences laboratory, for there is simply no Earth-
bound substitute. The Space Station is a critical 
next step if the U.S. is to have a manned space 
program in the future. At the same time, the Space 
Station can also provide a capability for important 
microgravity research, and for practical experience in 
manufacturing under low-gravity conditions. While 
not, in our opinion, a sufficient justification of Space 
Station in and of itself, microgravity research does 
represent an altogether valid element of America's 
economic competitiveness program. 
Eli
Given these conclusions, we believe the justify-
ing objectives of the Space Station Freedom should 
be reduced to two: primarily life sciences, and 
secondarily microgravity experimentation. In turn, 
we believe the Space Station Freedom can be 
simplified, reduced in cost, and constructed on a 
more evolutionary, modular basis that enables end-
to-end testing of most systems prior to launch, and 
reduces extravehicular flight requirements along the 
lines NASA is now considering. We also believe that 
steps must be taken to mitigate dependence on the 
Space Shuttle. 
Given all of this, we would encourage NASA 
and the Congress not to be bound by the 90-day 
restructuring period for Space Station Freedom 
recently directed by Congress. Redesign is simply 
too important to take less than whatever time may 
be needed for a thorough reassessment and the 
establishment of a configuration that can earn stable, 
long term funding support. 
Having thus defined a Mission to Planet Earth 
(MTPE) and a Mission from Planet Earth (MFPE) 
as the keystones we recommend for America's future 
civil space program, there remain two vital elements 
of space infrastructure to which attention must be 
devoted. This infrastructure underpins the nation's 
ability to actually undertake advanced space mis-
sions, and is addressed in two parts: first, the 
technology base, and second, the Earth-to-space 
transportation system. Great space pursuits should 
not be undertaken without proper attention being 
devoted to these more mundane but critical aspects 
of the space endeavor. 
First and foremost in this foundation-laying 
effort is the technology base which absolutely must 
be replenished. America has not initiated develop-
ment of a new main rocket engine the muscle of 
any space pursuit	 in nearly two decades. Work on 
advanced space power systems has been modest; on 
very high specific impulse propulsion devices even 
more limited, on advanced concepts such as 
aerobraking only formative. In fact, the overall 
technical base underpinning the space program has 
been permitted to languish in terms of funding for 
several decades. This effort has not, in recent years, 
enjoyed the support of the Legislative Branch, or, in 
earlier years, of the Executive Branch. This must be 
corrected. 
The second element of space infrastructure 
concerns the provision of high-confidence, reason-
able-risk transportation to space. In this regard, the 
U.S. will be unalterably committed to the Space 
Shuttle for many years hence. Thus, NASA simply 
must take those steps needed to enhance the 
Shuttle's reliability, minimize wear and tear, and
enhance launch schedule predictability. Cost 
reductions also are desirable but secondary to the 
preceding objectives. 
We further conclude that NASA should proceed 
immediately to phase some of the burden being 
carried by the Space Shuttle to a new unmanned 
(but potentially man-rateable) launch vehicle. The 
new launch vehicle should offer increased payload 
capacity and be derivable wherever practicable from 
existing components to save time and cost. Presum-
ably, some of these components could be obtained 
selectively from the Shuttle system itself, including 
launch facilities. Future enhancements would use 
elements derived from the Advanced Launch System 
technology program in progress under the coopera-
tive management of NASA and the Department of 
Defense. Such an evolving heavy lift launch system 
should be designed to produce substantial reduc-
tions in launch costs; a major, albeit moderately 
declining, portion of NASA's budget. 
It should be recognized that the substantial near 
term costs of developing any new heavy lift launch 
vehicle make a purely financial argument for its 
existence not particularly compelling. Rather, the 
objective is to attain a reliable, unmanned vehicle 
that complements the Space Shuttle and that can be 
used for routine space trucking, saving the Space 
Shuttle for those missions requiring human presence. 
The resulting reduced demand for the Shuttle will 
help relieve the schedule pressures which have 
contributed to some of the problems the program 
has encountered. 
Even though selected Space Shuttle components 
and existing launch facilities might be used for the 
proposed new launch vehicle, the hazards of cou-
pling failure modes between these two vehicles can 
be reduced to what we believe is an acceptable level. 
In short, we must buttress the civil space program's 
capacity and means of access to space as soon as 
possible. 
Over the longer term, the nation must turn to 
new and revolutionary technologies to build more 
capable and significantly less costly means to launch 
manned and unmanned spacecraft, including those 
that one day will travel to the Moon and Mars. 
However, the type of launch vehicle and the specific 
operational concept that will be needed to propel 
spacecraft from the Earth's surface to orbit and on to 
the Moon and Mars will depend on the results of 
mission architecture studies now underway. In the 
meantime, while we await the definition of the 
future spacecraft and launch vehicle requirements, 
the nation must maintain a vigorous Advanced 
Launch System technology program. This program, 
augmented by new propulsion technologies, will
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the basis for completely new and revolutionary 
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:c. NASA's accomplishments 
over the years in space science and technology have 
helped motivate other nations to pursue space 
programs of their own. The success and interests of 
these new participants in the civil space arena places 
NASA's role in a somewhat changed context as we 
approach a new millennium, one where our nation 
must both cooperate and compete. International 
cooperation can serve to demonstrate leadership, to 
forge productive relationships and to broaden the 
range of available opportunities for accomplishment, 
as has been shown through a long and successful 
history of NASA-supported international partner-
ships. But international agreements can also lead to 
bureaucratic constraints and delays where many 
levels of approval are required for each decision. 
The Committee notes that international commit-
ments must be made carefully, supported by all 
affected parts of the government prior to consum-
mation, including the Congress, and thereafter 
honored scrupulously. We emphasize that interna-
tional cooperation should continue to be an integral 
part of the U.S. civil space program. But we also 
emphasize that the U.S. should retain management 
control for critical in-line program elements in 
certain long term undertakings such as human space 
exploration, and that the U.S. must continue to 
have a fully competitive stance in areas such as the 
access to space itself, i.e., launch vehicles which have 
broad impact on the fundamental viability of 
America's civil and commercial space programs. 
l.ui,ii Fiueil ( )!iseratio,is. This, then, is the space 
program that our Committee recommends. A 
number of further recommendations are offered in 
the text concerning management improvements, and 
the all-important matter during the years ahead of 
attracting to and retaining within NASA a share of 
the nation's most capable people. Organization 
charts and improved management practices will 
prove altogether hollow if NASA is not permitted to 
attract the extraordinary people needed to success-
fully pursue the energetic goals prescribed herein. 
Many of the recommendations we offer deal 
with the seemingly mundane aspects of the space 
program - but, in our view, are of no less impor-
tance than the higher-impact recommendations we 
also offer. These recommendations and suggestions 
are included in the text and address such matters as
enhancing cost estimating capabilities, increasing 
cost, schedule and performance margins, and 
strengthening systems engineering. 
How shall we pay the bills for all of this? First, 
as already noted, we assume growth in civil space 
funding for the next decade. We also recommend a 
redesign of the Space Station, in part, to reduce 
cost. We would propose diverting funds from the 
planned additional Space Shuttle orbiter (but not 
from support hardware needed to assure the Space 
Shuttle's continued operational viability) to enable 
construction of the new unmanned heavy lift launch 
vehicle. We believe that a new unmanned launch 
vehicle itself can produce substantial savings 	 but 
not in the near term and in the longer term only if 
we change our processing philosophy and man-
power. We recommend configuring the long term 
manned exploration program, which focuses on 
Mars but has critical stepping stones along the way 
in the form of the Space Station and a lunar base, to 
a schedule that adapts to the availability of funding. 
And we propose a number of management enhance-
ments that should produce efficiencies and modest 
attendant cost savings. The most important of this 
category of improvement, however, is not fully 
within NASA's wherewithal to implement 
namely, the provision of predictable and stable 
funding. This will require the support of other parts 
of the Administration and the Congress. The 
essential role of this support cannot be overempha-
sized if the U.S. is to have a successful civil space 
program. 
It should also be noted that NASA has a 
number of other responsibilities to which it must 
attend. Foremost among these is the continued 
support of a strong aeronautics program - the 
linchpin of America's competitiveness in civil 
aviation. NASA should also continue to help 
nurture a commercial space industry, as it has in 
recent years. The Committee is strongly committed 
to the free enterprise system and believes NASA 
should do only those things that cannot be satisfac-
torily performed in the private sector, including 
academia and industry. There are, of course, many 
matters which can only be done within the govern-
ment, including, to name but a few, the pursuit of 
leading-edge, high cost research with uncertain or 
long term payoff; planning and providing specialized 
joint-use facilities; and administering contracts and 
monitoring the performance of contractors. 
Finally, in regard to NASA's other responsibili-
ties, we applaud its on-going efforts to enhance the 
nation's mathematics and science programs. 
We believe that the legacy our generation 
should leave to the future is that we pioneered the 
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exploration of space, and thereby made important 
discoveries that will prove of benefit to all mankind. 
However, space activity is inherently difficult - 
involving advanced technology and taking place over 
great distances. It demands reliance upon machines, 
often very complex machines, which are designed, 
tested and operated by mortals. It involves rewards 
which may be intangible. 
As we labor under such challenges, we should 
insist upon excellence. We should strive for perfec-
tion. We should demand the utmost of those to 
whom we entrust our space endeavor. But we 
should be prepared for the occasional failure. If we 
as a nation are to place a greater premium on letting 
nothing go wrong, on not making errors, and on 
ridiculing those who strive but occasionally fail, than 
we place upon seeking potentially great accomplish-
ments, then we have no business in space.
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The United States in Space 
Today's civil space program is the product of its 
history
 and its goals for the future. Over time, the 
basic character of the space program has undergone 
change, perhaps most notable being the evolution 
from brief "one-time" events to prolonged opera-
tions, including the continuing use of the Space 
Shuttle, the planned establishment and operation of 
the Space Station Freedom, and, in the President's 
words, "... back to the Moon ... this time back to 
stay ." This trend has placed, and will continue to 
place, increasing demands on NASA as it pursues 
challenging new development projects
	 if it does 
not shed at least sonic ongoing operational projects. 
The assignment of responsibility for operation of 
meteorological satellites to the National Oceano-
graphic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) is 
an excellent example of the needed approach. 
A balanced assessment of today's civil space 
program is facilitated by a review of how we got to 
where we are, the challenges of space flight, the 
realities of risk taking and the overall objectives that 
Should be met by any future space program 
especially
 within the realistic constraints of 
affordability. Each of these topics is addressed in 
this section. 
Historical Perspective 
The first American and Soviet space flight projects 
started only one day apart. On July
 29 and 30, 
1955, both Washington and Moscow announced 
plans to launch artificial satellites during the 1957 
International Geophysical Year. But the Space Age 
birth date is clearl y
 October 4, 1957, when the 
Soviet Union launched its 184-pound Sputnik into 
orbit, the space equivalent of the Wright Brothers' 
Kitty Hawk flight just 54 'ears earlier on December 
17, 1903. 
What was the perspective of the entire histor y, of 
aviation by the year 1940, the elapsed time corre-
sponding to our 1990 view of the space program? 
One significant difference stands out: aviation 
emerged in a time of relative world peace while 
space was born amidst tensions brought about by 
the Cold War. In 1940, the world was poised on 
the edge of conflict. In 1990, most of the world is 
united to a degree few of us can recall, despite the 
adventures of an occasional renegade leader on the 
world political scene.
The launch of Sputnik shocked our nation, and 
the reaction was sift and far-reaching (Figure 5). 
Wernher von Braun's team at Redstone Arsenal was 
eventually
 given permission to launch a satellite on 
the Arm y's Jupiter C rocket. They succeeded, on 
January,
 31, 1958, in the launch of the 10-1/2-
pound Explorer I, carrying into orbit two micro-
meteorite detectors, a Geiger counter, and associated 
telemetry . Despite its small size relative to Sputnik, 
these miniaturized instruments gave birth to space 
science by
 discovering and mapping what came to be 
known as the Van Allen radiation belts surrounding 
Earth. 
Within a few months, on July 29 Congress 
passed the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 
1958, a far-reaching piece of legislation that created 
the civilian NASA and provided guidance to our 
national space program that still appears fresh today. 
NASA opened for business with a complement of 
nearl y
 8,000 employees transferred from the Na-
tional Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA). 
By
 the end of 1960, NASA's personnel rolls nearly 
doubled with the addition of von Braun's Army 
Ballistic Missile Agency (later renamed the Marshall 
Space Flight Center); the new Goddard Space Flight 
Center, initiall y
 staf1id from groups at the Naval 
Research Laboratory and the Naval Ordnance 
Laboratory ; and the Jet Propulsion Laboratory of 
the California Institute of Technology, then and 
now a university - operated facility. 
But the Soviets were not standing still during 
those formative years. A month after the launch of 
Sputnik I, the six-ton Sputnik II rocketed into orbit. 
Its payload included a 1,121-pound capsule contain-
ing the life-support equipment for the canine 
cosmonaut, Laika, whose presence clearl y presaged 
human space flight. That expectation was fulfilled 
on April 12, 1961, when the Soviet cosmonaut Yuri 
Gagarin became the first human to achieve Earth 
orbit. His dramatic space flight captured the 
imagination of the world and challenged American 
technology
 and leadership. The Kennedy Adminis-
tration resolved to gain the lead in space. After 
rejecting an orbiting space station as too easily 
within Soviet capabilities and an expedition to Mars 
as too difficult to accomplish in a decade, a landing 
on the Moon appeared to be an achievable project 
that would challenge NASA in all areas of space 
flight, and establish the U.S. as the preeminent 
spacefaring nation. 
Thus, before any
 American had vet flown in 
orbit, President Kenned y, on May
 25, 1961, asked 
Congress to direct NASA to land astronauts on the 
Moon and return them safely to Earth within the 
decade. The projected $20 billion cost of the first
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lunar landing ($94 billion in 1990 dollars) would 
boost NASA's budget to its peak in 1965, about 0.8 
percent of the Gross National Product (GNP), but 
the alternative of surrendering space leadership 
appeared unthinkable. 
The response was dramatic. The von Braun 
team initiated a fast-paced project to develop the 
essential heavy lift launch vehicle, the huge three-
stage Saturn V that would lift 120 tons of payload 
into near-Earth orbit as the first step on the 
240,000-mile voyage to the Moon. A giant new 
launch complex was built at Cape Canaveral; a new 
manned space flight center was constructed at 
Houston; a worldwide tracking and data network 
was established; and new industrial and university 
research facilities were created across the country. 
The precursor Mercury and Gemini programs were 
conducted to develop the necessary technologies for 
Apollo, and robotic missions were sent to character-
ize the lunar surface. On July 20, 1969, Neil 
Armstrong, Buzz Aldrin, and Mike Collins flew the 
historic Apollo 11 mission that touched down on 
the lunar Sea of Tranquillity "for all mankind" 	 on 
time and within budget. 
The Apollo program dominated the public 
perception of NASA during the decade of the 1960s 
and beyond, through the launch of Apollo 17 in 
1972. But there was also a "silent" civil space 
program of considerable magnitude underway 
during this same period, one whose legacy may be 
even more lasting. During the Apollo period seven 
successful missions were launched to other planets of 
our solar system, giving rise to the new field of 
planetary science. Following the success of 
Explorer I, more than 70 scientific satellites were 
launched, each success accruing new discoveries in 
space physics. Nine successful solar and astronomi-
cal observatories were launched, permitting, for the 
first time, observations of the solar s ystem and 
beyond from outside our atmosphere. 
Science was not the only beneficiary of 
America's space program. A space applications eflort 
was horn on April 1, 1960, when Tiros I, the first 
meteorology
 satellite, was launched. Twenty-nine 
more such satellites were launched during the 
Apollo period, and the meteorology program 
became fulls operational when the responsibility for 
operational meteorology satellites was assumed by 
NOAA and its predecessor agencies in the mid-
1960s.
The first passive communications satellite, 
Echo I, was placed into orbit on August 12, 1960, 
and the first successful synchronous communications 
satellite (Syncom II) was orbited on July 26, 1963. 
A host of other communications payloads gave birth 
to the communications satellite industry, now 
generating $2.5 billion annually in the U.S. and $3.7 
billion worldwide. 
Other satellites were launched to monitor 
Earth's atmosphere and observe the ocean. The first 
Earth Resources Technology Satellite (now known 
as Landsat) was launched in 1972, providing repeti-
tive coverage of the entire Earth (except the Polar 
regions) every 18 days. James Fletcher, NASA 
Administrator in 1975, said: "If! had to pick one 
spacecraft, one space development to save the world, 
I would pick ERTS (Landsat) and the satellites 
which I believe will be evolved from it late in this 
decade." 
In retrospect, NASA's accomplishments of the 
Apollo period provide an historical guidepost for the 
attributes of the Space Program which America 
should seek to maintain in the future; one that is 
capable of providing an impressive stream of scien-
tific information to help us understand the physical 
order of the universe in ways that can aid this and 
future generations; and one that insures that the 
opportunities we open for operating in space can be 
applied to practical problems here on Earth. A 
lesson that history offers is that the space program 
seems to work best, to provide these scientific and 
practical benefits, when there is an overreaching goal 
that can generate public support and focus the 
technological infrastructure on tangible objectives. 
We believe this to be an important observation. 
The Apollo program was an enormous techno-
logical achievement, and its momentum carried the 
NASA manned programs forward into the 1970s. In 
1973, Apollo components were modified to launch 
the 120-ton Skylab prototype space station. The last 
Saturn rocket launched an Apollo Command Service 
Module for the 1975 Apollo-Soyuz Project. 
But the transient motive behind the Apollo 
program and the rapid mobilization of funds and 
personnel that made success possible - eventually 
impeded the gradual evolution of a stable and broad 
public consensus about the nation's purpose in 
space. Thus, Vice President Agnew, in 1969, 
appointed a Space Task Group to explore post-
Apollo manned space flight alternatives. Proposed 
programs included a large orbiting space station, a 
reusable Space Shuttle, continuing lunar exploration, 
and a mission to Mars. Of these, President Nixon 
selected to pursue the Space Shuttle. The "Moon 
race" was won, and national attention turned
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elsewhere. Saturn V production was terminated, 
and the space program's budget slumped hack to 
one-third of its 1960s peak in terms of constant 
dollars. 
Nonetheless, impressive space science achieve -
merits continued, including the Pioneer 10 Jupiter 
fly by in 1973, the Mariner 10 Mercury fly by in 
1974, the Viking 1 and 2 in-situ analyses of Martian 
materials in 1976, and the Pioneer 11 Saturn fly by 
in 1979. However, during this period funding for 
space research and technology dropped more than 
80 percent from its peak in 1965. The applications 
effort also had its unique problems. Despite the 
successes of meteorology, communications, and 
Earth observations, government policy increasingly 
became, in essence: "If there is a user, either private 
or public, NASA's role should he confined to initial 
technological demonstration of feasibility. There -
after, the user should pick up both the cost of, and 
responsibility for, further development, demonstra-
tion and operations." Thus, for example, it was 
expected that all research and development support-
ing space communications would be assumed by 
industry, despite substantial evidence of industry's 
inability and unwillingness to assume this responsi-
bilitv. This prompted the ritual lasting several years 
whereby the Administration would strike all funds 
for the Advanced Communications Technology 
Satellite (ACTS), and Congress would reinstate 
them (Figure 6). Other examples include the 
transfer of Landsat to NOAA with the stipulation 
that Earth surveillance activities enter the private 
domain, despite the fact that the principal customers 
of Landsat data are government agencies who arc 
loath to commit to any long-term funding for data 
products, and researchers who generall y have 
government grants insufficient in size to purchase 
commercial products. Even toda y the successful 
meteorological satellite system may suffi.r unless 
funding is provided to undertake the development 
of new instrumentation, either directly to NASA or 
through inclusion in the NOAA budget and subse-
quent transfer to NASA. 
To continue manned space flight, the reusable 
Space Shuttle development program was initiated in 
1972, the two principal goals being increased access 
to space and a substantial reduction in the cost of 
orbital flight. Unfortunatel y , budget cuts, technical 
problems and continuing stretch-outs forced design 
compromises that led to performance shortfalls. The 
resultant schedule dela ys and cost overruns also 
severel y impacted NASA's science and exploration 
programs. NASA's own Advisory Council began 
preparation of a report with the descriptive title 
"The Crisis in Space and Earth Science," which
outlined the serious difficulties caused b y fewer and 
fewer flight opportunities. The Shuttle is a great 
technical achievement, but a failure at reducing 
costs. Nevertheless, these problems were beginning 
to he forgotten in the earls' 1980s as 24 Shuttles 
were successfull y flown, and the nation viewed such 
spectacular achievements as huge satellites being 
deployed in space and astronauts capturing and 
repairing malfunctioning satellites and performing 
in-space experiments. Man y took success largely for 
granted	 until January 28, 1986, when the nation 
was stunned by the Challenger failure. 
The immediate consequence was that part of 
the U.S. civil space program that depends on the 
Space Shuttle was essentiall y put "on hold" for over 
2-1/2 years. An earlier national decision to 
maximize the economy of the Shuttle by scrapping 
virtuall y all expendable launch vehicles, coupled 
with flight failures among those expendable vehicles 
that did remain, made it a virtual certainty that 
nothing could he launched. After decades of success 
and approbation, NASA felt the wrath of even its 
friends. The science community found large 
fractions of their careers "on hold" and the prob-
lems outlined b y the "Crisis" report were exacer-
bated. It was a difficult period for the men and 
women who had built their careers in the space 
agency. 
Even after space flight was re-established in 
September 1988, considerable disenchantment 
lingered	 encouraged by some parts of the media 
that by this time had turned "NASA-bashing" into a 
journalistic art. Criticism for a lack of "goals" was 
inflicted, even though man y parts of the agency had 
recently improved their strategic planning and 
established rather specific goals. 
Earlier, and to supply needed direction to the 
manned program, President Reagan initiated, in 
1984, the Space Station Freedom program as "the 
next step in space" that would provide for a "perma-
nent human presence." Its goals were not consid-
ered sufficiently specific by the Congress, however, 
which in turn created the Presidential National 
Commission on Space to look "beyond the next 
step" and to recommend long-range goals for the 
United States civil space program. Unfortunately, 
the timing of the Commission's report coincided 
with the Challenger accident, postponing any 
prospects for implementation. 
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Thirteen successful Shuttle flights have occurred 
since operauons were resumed in September 1988. 
Significant Shuttle successes include the launch of 
the Hubble Space Telescope, the Magellan mission 
to map Venus, the Galileo mission to Jupiter, and 
Europe's Ulysses tour around Jupiter and back to 
the Sun's polar regions. Yet, while there have been 
significant management changes within NASA and 
exciting missions are being planned and flown, there 
remain valid concerns. 
Such is the environment as we enter the 1990s. 
The Ideal Space Program 
The United States has progressed a long wa y in 
space since the initial shock of Sputnik. A broad 
space program has evolved over time, and a space 
organization structure has emerged which includes 
governmental, industrial and academic segments.
All of these elements were created, modified and 
adapted to political, economic and international 
factors which have undergone significant change 
since the early days of the NASA space program. 
We are thus at an appropriate time to step back 
and view where we are going and what is the best 
way to get there. Among the most needed ingredi-
ents of America's space program is a consensus of 
support for its goals and its resource needs - 
whatever they may he. Only with such a commit-
ment on an enduring basis can our nation hope to 
undertake the challenging, long-term missions that 
comprise any space program worthy of pursuit. It is 
instructive to ask the question what an "ideal" space 
program and organization might look like and what 
would be its attributes. We would characterize the 
"ideal" space program as comprising:
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• a challenging set of space missions, strongly 
supported by the American people over extended 
periods because it contributes to the nation's 
well-being and is affordable; 
• a set of space prograni building blocks and 
technology achievements that can be clearly 
related to the overall mission and affordability 
levels; 
• a program that receives stable, multi- year fund-
ing, is relativel y insensitive to technology setbacks 
or even an occasional failure while routinely 
delivering useful, incremental technological 
developments, including the occasional "break-
through;" 
• an organization that continuall y attracts and 
retains its share of the nation's best talent; and 
• an effort that yields visible and significant results, 
SC) that the American taxpayer can justifiably 
believe that the organization is accomplishing its 
mission efficiently, effectively , and in a fiscally 
responsible manner while contributing to our 
pursuit of knowledge, the quality of life here on 
Earth, and to the inspiration of all peoples. 
The President has proposed to the nation a 
challenging set of space missions but the Congress 
has not yet appropriated the resources needed to 
carry, them out. There appears to be strong support 
from the American people for a national space effort, 
but disagreement on its elements. The United 
States has a far more capable space organization than 
is generally appreciated - but one that is not, in our 
opinion, satisfactorily structured to accomplish its 
current goals and that, without help, is not likel y to 
he able to acquire and retain the talent needed to 
carry out these goals over the long-term. 
Excellence and Risk Taking 
The most fundamental ingredient of a successful 
space program, aside from the people who partici-
pate in it, is the culture or work environment in 
which it is conducted. There is no more important 
task for managers at all levels of NASA and its 
contractors than to nurture a culture of excellence; 
of complete dedication to product qualit y and safety; 
and to total teamwork in achieving that goal. Space 
is a very unforgiving place. It is highl y intolerant of 
human failings or benign neglect - even of the type 
that might be considered minor under less stressing-
circumstances. Space activities demand the utmost 
of everyone in any vav associated with them. In 
short, there can he no acceptable objective among 
those who would challenge the vastness of space 
other than perfection. 
Unfortunately, this is an objective not readily 
met by humans, even though it remains the goal. 
But perfection can most closel y he approached in an 
organization whose ethos is one of excellence and 
where this ethos permeates everything it does. Such 
an organization must insist upon great personal 
dedication, encourage unwavering self-scrutiny and 
self-discipline, and promote constructive question -
ing. It must he clear to all that, in this culture, 
excellence is more important than schedule and 
more important than cost even though these too 
are important
	
and that management at all levels 
can be reliabl y counted upon to act with this as its 
set of values. 
To sustain such an environment necessitates 
team-building; the success of the mission is more 
important than the immediate role of a given 
individual, center, or contractor. It requires as 
participants, people who are knowledgeable enough 
to recognize even the hint of an emerging problem, 
who are motivated enough to care, and who are 
courageous enough to do something about it. 
For its part, management at all levels must 
create a culture in which people are activel y encour-
aged to disclose even minor anomalies, to put 
problems squarely on the table. Equally important, 
it must be clear that management and workers alike 
will not for a moment tolerate those who would 
intentionall y undermine this culture of excellence, 
since to do so is to nourish an organizational cancer. 
Such a culture is not easily created. Fortunately, 
among NASA's strengths over the years has been 
the focus on mission success, and this focus needs to 
be continuall y reinforced. There is no more impor-
tant responsibility for NASA's management. 
But NASA's mission is a difficult one, probably 
more difficult than that of any other organization in 
the world. Each Vo yager spacecraft has the dcc-
tr()nic circuitry of over 2,000 color television sets, 
vet is required to work for 12 years while traveling 
from Earth to Neptune. The two Voyager space-
craft schedules were absolutel y unforgiving, the 
planets in their paths aligning themselves onl y once 
every 176 years. Yet, by the time Voyager 2 reached 
Neptune, 4.4 billion miles away and 12 years later, 
the spacecraft was a mere 22 miles off its charted 
course and onl y one second off its updated fly by 
time. Mechanical challenges are equally impressive. 
Each Space Shuttle contains some 300 miles of 
electrical wiring, over 3,000 feet of welds, and over
2.5 million lines of software code. Its pumps propel 
65,000 gallons (the capacity of a large swimming 
pool) through its engines each minute. The power 
turbine on the Shuttle operates at a temperature of 
1,300 degrees Fahrenheit. Just 4 feet away, the 
pump turbine operates at minus 400 degrees 
Fahrenheit. 
The opportunities for human error are thus 
formidable. At its peak, Viking involved some 
13,000 people, Skylab 32,000, Space Shuttle 
52,000, and Apollo 180,000. The Hubble Space 
Telescope involved a total of over 40 million hours 
of work. To process a Space Shuttle for flight 
requires that 1.2 million separate procedures be 
accomplished. 
Furthermore, NASA must do all that it does in 
the public spotlight
	 which is, of course, as it 
should be. But this leads to magnifying any errors. 
We doubt, however, that any large institution in 
America, public or private, would present a much 
better image over the long-term than does NASA, if 
subjected to similar visibility while pursuing such 
imposing tasks. 
But even with an objective of perfection, such 
challenging undertakings entail risk. Every person 
encounters some degree of risk daily. The chances 
of being killed in an automobile accident are about 
one in every 100 million miles driven. If we fly to 
some distant city , the chances are reduced to about 
one per billion miles. 
Risk has been a companion to all great human 
adventures. Today, astronauts routinely circum-
navigate the Earth in 90 minutes. In 1519, 
Ferdinand Magellan's quest to circumnavigate the 
globe began with five vessels and a crew of approxi-
mately 280. Only one ship and 34 crewmen 
returned, three years later. Magellan himself did not 
survive the voyage. In more contemporary
 circum-
stances, test pilots in the 1950s had a fatality rate of 
about one in four as the)' pushed the barriers of 
supersonic flight. 
In a very real sense, the space program is 
analogous to the exploration and settlement of the 
New World. In this view, risk and sacrifice are seen 
to he constant features of the American experience. 
There is a national heritage of risk taking handed 
down from earl)' explorers, immigrants, settlers, and 
adventurers. It is this element of our national 
character that is the wellspring of the U.S. space 
program.
Yet, today
 there seems to be the danger that the 
spark of adventure is flickering. As a nation, we are 
becoming risk averse. We demand only perfection, 
not as a goal - which we should - but as a reality, 
though none of us is perfect. We insist on cost 
benefit analyses although, as Daniel Boorstin, 
Librarian of Congress Emeritus, has pointed out, "the 
most wonderful things in life are not cost-effective 
- like love and children." Success should be 
sought, and prized when achieved, but not always 
expected. If it is expected, people will stop taking 
chances, and if people stop taking chances, nothing 
great will be accomplished. 
NASA has the critical responsibility of doing 
everything it can to minimize the human risk 
involved in meeting the nation's space goals, a 
responsibility that we believe it has now firmly 
embraced. This requires that NASA's engineers be 
selected from the best the nation has to offer, that 
they employ resilient designs, use the best technol-
ogy
 available, be meticulous in quality control and 
impervious to diversionary influences. 
Our Committee believes that, as in the past, we 
as a nation must be prepared to accept the conse-
quences of undertaking endeavors that are worth-
while but present some risk of failure. We should 
insist on perfection as a very real goal but should not 
make it more advantageous to avoid failures than to 
achieve successes. We should not be reckless, nor 
should we demur from all things entailing the risk of 
failure. Thus, the Committee believes that the 
Administration, Congress and the American people 
must be prepared for the eventuality that NASA will 
one day
 - perhaps not too far in the future - suffer 
another major accident. That is the reality. 
As President Kenned y once said: "We do these 
things not because they are easy, but because they 
are hard."
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General Concerns 
Before contemplating recommendations to 
strengthen America's future space program, it is 
advisable to have a solid comprehension of the 
concerns affecting America's present space program, 
as expressed by knowledgeable observers of, and 
participants in, that undertaking. Stated otherwise, 
it is a good idea to understand the problems before 
proposing solutions. 
The civil space program has been subjected to a 
variety of criticisms, particularly in recent years, 
some of which in our opinion are justified and 
others not. Whatever the case, a number of issues 
have been raised that most observers would agree 
are deserving of careful attention as the space 
program moves into what can be a phase of signifi-
cant future accomplishment. Among these concerns 
are the following nine issues. 
Lack of Consensus 
The President has promulgated a set of goals for 
much of the civil space program together with a 
schedule for accomplishing them. Questions have 
been raised, particularly in legislation enacted b y the 
Congress, as to the financial feasibility of achieving 
these goals	 at least in the manner they are 
currently being pursued. This disparity of objectives 
and resources is exacerbated by the fact that there 
exists a wide spectrum of perspectives, even among 
the participants in the space program, as to what its 
objectives should be, with some arguing for more 
emphasis on basic science and others promoting 
applications, some supporting a centerpiece manned 
program while others favor far more extensive use of 
robots. Clearly , any program that involves goals 
demanding 5, 10 or even 30 years for their achieve-
ment must enjoy a solid underpinning of broad, 
enduring support. The alternative is to suffer 
through a prolonged sequence of projects that are 
started, stopped, and restarted, onl y to be modified 
again and again. 
Overcommitment 
It is the Committee's considered judgment that 
NASA is oversubscribed in terms of the projects it is 
pursuing, given its financial and personnel resources 
and the time allotted to pursue them. There are at 
least two causes for this situation. First, projects 
have on occasion tended to grow in complexit y and
size as they
 have evolved, thereby demanding more 
resources than originally foreseen. Second, the 
initial estimates of required resources too often have 
been understated, particularly with regard to cost. 
This is an affliction that is by no means unique to 
NASA, but one that frequently has bedeviled large 
projects whether pursued in the public or private 
sector. The challenge of working at the edge of the 
technological state-of-the-art, which has been almost 
synonymous with the space program and will 
probably continue to be, makes all the more difficult 
the matter of accurately estimating future resource 
needs. 
Whatever the cause, the consequence is clear: 
too many projects are initiated, resource shortages 
appear, and margins, if ever any were present in the 
first place, are inexorably eroded until little or no 
management latitude remains. The nation's space 
program of the future must provide at the outset 
realistic estimates of needed resources and a manage-
ment approach compatible with the uncertainty 
therein. Major, high-technology undertakings 
necessitate the provision of margins - whether they 
be in goals, schedule, cost, design concept, or all of 
the above. Any failure to provide adequate margins 
virtually assures a perpetual resource dilemma for 
management and continual frustration for workers. 
Management Turbulence 
"Management turbulence," defined as continual 
changes in cost, schedule, goals, etc., is closely 
coupled with the previous two issues. Turbulence is 
most often the consequence of unforeseen technical 
problems, lack of design discipline, or unrealistic 
budget forecasting. Each change induced has a way 
of cascading through the entire project execution 
system, producing havoc at every step along the way. 
A change necessitated at NASA headquarters can 
affect several centers, each of which passes the 
change along to a number of major contractors who, 
in turn, domino the impact onto perhaps hundreds 
of subcontractors and in turn to even thousands of 
lower-tier suppliers. At each step, contracts must be 
renegotiated, people reassigned, designs changed 
and schedules revised. Soon, a disproportionate 
amount of time is spent in the pursuit of these 
change practices instead of producing the end 
product itself. 
The impact of excessive revisions in research 
contracts conducted by universities has much the 
same effect. In this case, substantial effort is devoted
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by academic researchers to the preparation of 
proposals for research support. When the presumed 
funds to support the work are subsequently diverted 
to other objectives, the productive talents of some of 
the nation's most able people are largely wasted. 
Perhaps the greatest price extracted by excessive 
turbulence is, however, the impact it has on motiva-
tion and morale of the individuals involved in 
carrying out projects	 both within government 
and outside	 who would prefer to devote their
abilities to more constructive endeavors. 
Institutional Aging 
NASA is now a third of a century old and no longer 
operates under the relativel y more flexible policies, 
regulations, and legislative environment that charac-
terized its earlier years. Among the concerns that 
have been most often heard by the Committee has 
been the suggestion that the civil space program has 
gradually become afflicted with some of the same 
ailments that are found in many other large, mature 
institutions, particularly those institutions which 
have no direct and immediate competition to 
stimulate change. It is said that, on occasion, 
projects appear to have been tailored to help per-
petuate the work force, rather than the work force 
having been tailored to meet the needs of the 
project. One by-product of any such practice is that 
it tends to maximize the number of organizations, 
and therefore interfaces, involved in a task 
exactly the opposite of generally accepted manage-
ment philosophy that argues for minimizing inter-
faces, the "nooks and crannies" where problems 
seem to breed. Concern was expressed by the 
Rogers Commission investigating the Challenger 
accident regarding the willingness of the various 
NASA centers to energetically support one another 
or take direction from headquarters. Similar obser-
vations have been expressed not only by individuals 
outside of NASA, but occasionally from within 
NASA as well. An intense effort by the current 
center and headquarters managements has been 
underway to redress these long-building trends, yet 
much remains to be accomplished in this most 
difficult of management challenges, a cultural shift.
challenging, unforgiving tasks that are NASA's 
everyday fare, whether it be flying a "human 
satellite," exploring the outer planets with a robot 
spacecraft, or peeking into the creation of the 
universe. Achievements such as these demand an 
adequate share of the nation's best and brightest. 
To obtain such people NASA must compete head-
to-head with a host of other world-class institutions, 
including the finest of industry and academia who 
are also seeking these very same people. Unfortu-
nately, broadly applicable civil service practices are 
not conducive to attracting and keeping people with 
specialty skills of the type so much in demand at 
NASA (and elsewhere). In the past, the challenge 
and excitement of the space program has been a 
significant inducement for exactly the type of people 
one wishes to attract. However, this form of 
currency has in recent years been somewhat deval-
ued as criticism has been heaped UOfl the civil space 
program and its participants, and as the image of 
public service in general has been permitted to 
deteriorate	 a development that the Committee 
decries. 
NASA today is moderately competitive in 
acquiring new college graduates, but not competi-
tive for experienced engineers and senior, 
technically-qualified managers. Deterrents include 
non-competitive pay, lack of sufficient coupling of 
pay and performance, inadequate compensation for 
moves, excessively bureaucratic hiring and firing 
procedures, and limited career development prac-
tices. In addition, NASA has now largely lost a 
principal source of leavening and fresh perspectives 
that was available throughout its early years in the 
form of mid-level employees who would forego 
positions in academia or industry to serve several 
years in government. This latter source of experi-
enced personnel has largely been denied in the effort 
to avoid potential conflict-of-interest situations. In 
short, given current policies, the Committee is not 
sanguine that in the future NASA will be able to 
obtain or retain the necessary cadre of skilled 
personnel in a field where the most critical asset is 
the talent of the individual participants. 
Technology Base 
Personnel 
Contrary to the popular saying, at NASA you do 
have to be a rocket scientist to fill many of its 
demanding positions. There are few organizations 
in the world that confront on a dail y basis the
Next to talented people and a culture of excellence, 
the most important underpinning of the civil space 
program is its technology base. This base comprises 
the effort to develop key building blocks such as 
engines, computers, materials, and the like that 
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enable significant new missions to be successfully 
undertaken. Unfortunately, this building-block 
effort does not always compete favorably with the 
missions themselves in contending for funds and 
skilled personnel. Often, fundamental development 
programs are less glamorous, less visible, have no 
organized constituency, and generally are comprised 
of a number of small- and medium-size projects. 
Nonetheless, the consequences of neglecting the 
technology base are very measurable indeed, not 
only impacting America's competitiveness but 
inducing major projects to be undertaken without a 
sufficient technological foundation in place. When 
problems are subsequently encountered, these 
projects must be restructured, usually accompanied 
by an increase in cost. The result is that major 
pursuits, with large work forces that cannot afford to 
be held in abeyance, siphon money from smaller 
research projects or from the technology base itself, 
and the whole cycle starts anew. It seems clear that 
our technology base, including its supporting 
facilities, must be revitalized and afforded priority 
commensurate with its importance if major new 
projects are to be pursued on a realistic basis in the 
decades ahead.
neering pursuits seems to be toward bigness; that 
specific guards must be established against unjusti-
fied growth; and that, in any event, the issue must be 
addressed on a case-by-case basis. 
Attention to Detail 
Although not specifically within the purview of this 
Committee, the technical problems that have 
occurred in the past in the civil space program have a 
bearing on the formulation and execution of any 
future space program. Further, these problems have 
been at the root of much of the recent criticism 
directed at NASA. Such occurrences cannot be 
assigned a single cause, nor can they be precluded by 
promulgating still more regulations. Their preven-
tion requires redundant, flexible designs, explicit test 
procedures, independent checks and balances, 
unwavering discipline and, above all, inquisitive, 
penetrating, and challenging people
	 people who 
are not satisfied merely to fill the squares of regula-
tions but rather are continually questioning and 
ferreting out anomalies to be placed in full view of 
all involved.
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Big Projects vs. Little Projects 
A debate continues over the efficacy of pursuing a 
few large space projects as opposed to (many) small 
projects. It has been asserted, sometimes justifiably, 
that cost overruns in large projects often have been 
to the direct detriment of small research and tech-
nology undertakings, which are called upon to pay 
the bills. This concern far transcends the civil space 
program and is endemic to the "Big Science - Little 
Science" debate in general. 
Some large projects are clearly unavoidable if 
one wishes to pursue certain goals. One cannot, for 
example, send humans to the Moon in other than a 
very big project. Large projects also sometimes offer 
economies of scale, permitting the sharing of a 
computer, attitude control system, communications 
link, or tracking channel among a number of 
component experiments. Nonetheless, a great deal 
of useful science can be undertaken for the cost of  
single major project. Furthermore, the time scale of 
large projects often is incompatible with the needs of 
academic institutions seeking to educate the nation's 
future scientists and engineers, and seeking research 
projects in which to participate. Clearly, no single 
answer to the "big vs. little" dilemma exists, but it 
must be recognized that bigness is not of itself 
goodness; that the natural tendency of most engi-
Resilience of the Space 
Transportation System 
America's civil space program is heavily dependent 
upon the continued successful and timely operation 
of the Space Shuttle. The Space Station Freedom, 
for example, demands a substantial number of 
Shuttle launches on a relatively predictable schedule. 
The Shuttle, even with its 1970's technology, is 
demonstrably capable of performing such under-
takings as man-tended satellite repair and recovery 
missions. However, it has not realized the economic 
benefits formed from the foundation of its original 
justification, and in terms of operating rhythm it in 
no way
 emulates the functioning of commercial 
airlines with which it is sometimes (inadvisably) 
compared. It is the Committee's belief that routine, 
on-time operation is not likely in the foreseeable 
future. It is concluded, therefore, that we are today 
overreliant on the Space Shuttle as the backbone of 
the civil space program.
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The Findings 
Each of the major issues addressed by the 
Committee is examined in this section of the report 
and, where appropriate, recommendations are 
offered. 
Goals and Affordability 
Goals. The National Aeronautics and Space Act of 
1958, as amended, has served this country well and 
served to establish the fundamentals of America's 
space program. Much of the mission statement 
contained therein, despite its origin over 30 years 
ago, is equally valid today, including: 
• "...it is the policy of the United States that 
activities in space should be devoted to peaceful 
purposes for the benefit of mankind." 
• "...NASA [should] seek and encourage to the 
maximum extent possible the fullest commercial 
use of space." 
• "...[the program should seek] expansion of 
human knowledge of the Earth and of phenom-
ena in the atmosphere and space." 
• "...[an objective is] the preservation of the role of 
the United States as a leader in aeronautical and 
space science and technology..." 
• "...[there should be] cooperation by the United 
States with other nations and groups of nations in 
work done pursuant to this Act..." 
The Space Act clearly sets forth the basic 
rationale for today's space program. In fact, how-
ever, our original national space effort was to a 
considerable extent founded on the need to assure 
national security . The revelation of the advanced 
state of Soviet technology, reflected in Sputnik, and 
the development of intercontinental ballistic missiles 
propelled America's space and advanced military, 
technology efforts for many years. Fortunately, the 
current world situation is in stark contrast to that 
which existed in the late 1950s and 1960s. This 
change is punctuated by events in the Soviet Union 
and Eastern Europe, arms control initiatives, and 
improving international relations in many (but not 
all) parts of the world.
However, other concerns are replacing the 
primary
 military
 threat to our national well being. 
These new threats are economic and ecological, and 
are closely tied to other important issues such as 
education and energy. From an economic view-
point, many nations around the world threaten U.S. 
technological leadership and competitiveness. 
Deputy Secretary
 of Commerce Thomas J. Murrin, 
in testimony before the Committee, summarized the 
situation, stating: "While space missions may uplift 
our spirits and enhance our prestige, it is economic 
competition which will ultimately determine our 
standard of living, the jobs that we and our children 
hold and, to a large extent, our national security and 
our international influence. The potential for space 
activities to enhance our economic progress will 
directly affect this nation's ability - and its will - 
to continue to be a permanent leader in the world." 
In these changing times, our space program clearly 
must be increasingly responsive to our future 
economic needs. 
Another emerging threat that will impact our 
quality of life arises as a result of abuse of our 
natural environment. To implement effective and 
economical solutions to environmental problems, we 
must first understand them. Observations from 
space of our changing ecosphere will very likely 
prove invaluable in this endeavor. 
The basic "imperatives" of today's national civil 
space effort are, therefore, to: 
• sustain our heritage to learn, explore, and dis-
cover; 
• maintain our technological competitiveness in 
global markets; and 
• enhance the quality of life for all people on Earth. 
In addition, the civil space program should 
continue to contribute to the national security and 
foreign policy objectives of the United States. 
Affordability. The affordability of these space goals 
is a major concern, particularly in the current fiscal 
environment. Furthermore, we must recognize that 
it is difficult, if not impossible, to determine the 
precise cost of certain long-term future space 
endeavors - particularly the more costl y ones. 
Uncertainties of vet-to- be-demonstrated technolo-
gies alone preclude precision in estimating costs. 
Nevertheless, long-range programs such as those
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characteristic of space efforts demand that we be 
Rcporr oftht, prepared to undertake long-range funding commit-
ments. This has in fact been the case in the past 
Adj'isor where substantial sums were devoted over reasonably 
long periods to civil space projects 	 as indicated in 
(O/1 ;,Iztt the following table: 
Ofl t/3(
Program	 Total Program Cost 
Development Cost	 as Percent of 
Program	 (Billions of 1990 Dollars)	 1967 GNP* 
U.S.	 pile Apollo	 $94.07	 2.38 
Shuttle	 27.77	 0.61 
J'roqram Skylab	 9.23	 0.22 
Viking	 2.94	 0.07 
Hubble Space Telescope	 2.08	 0.04 
Galileo	 1.27	 0.03 
* Constant dollars in peak funding year
During the peak funding years of Apollo in the 
mid-1960s (well before the lunar landings), an 
emerging basis for space program affordability was 
being established, at least for that time, consisting of 
approximately 0.8 percent of the Gross National 
Product, 4.5 percent of the federal budget and about 
6 percent of total federal discretionar y spending. 
Since the sixth and last Apollo landing on the 
Moon, the NASA budget has declined by each of the 
above measures. For the past 15 years, it has hov-
ered in the vicinity of 0.2 percent of the GNP, 
1.0 percent of the federal budget, and 2.5 percent of 
total federal discretionary spending. 
A number of studies have outlined vigorous 
space programs, many quite similar to the President's 
recent initiative. While these programs differ some-
what in content and schedule, they are surprisingly 
consistent regarding the near-term level of funding 
required. Based on our own review, we believe that 
a reinvigorated space program will require real 
growth in the NASA budget of approximately 10 
percent per year (through the year 2000) reaching a 
peak spending level of about $30 billion per year (in 
constant 1990 dollars) by about the year 2000. Such 
a program will: 
• provide for the basic infrastructure to operate 
NASA, the recommended Science program, the 
recommended and expanded Technology pro-
gram, a Mission to Planet Earth, a new start on a 
phased and evolutionary heavy lift launch vehicle 
and a reconfigured Space Station; and 
• provide sufficient funds to begin laying the 
foundation for lunar and Mars missions on a 
schedule that will permit real progress and 
significant periodic technical achievements leading 
to a manned Mars mission in approximately 30 
years, i.e., Mission from Planet Earth.
If a level of funding of about 0.4 percent of the 
GNP can be achieved by 2000, and sustained 
thereafter, then a vigorous but controlled civil space 
program can he pursued. The Committee believes 
that, given the benefits it provides for the future of 
this country, the nation's civil space program should 
receive funding support of this general magnitude. 
If the program cannot receive support from the 
Administration and Congress at this level, then the 
achievement of goals of the manned exploration 
program should be delayed, and the magnitude of 
the Mission to Planet Earth reduced. Continuing to 
strive for ambitious goals with inadequate resources 
will only lead to continuing overcommitment. The 
Committee suggests, therefore, that unless resources 
on the order of 10 percent real growth, eventually 
reaching about 0.4 percent of GNP, can be sus-
tained, then a commensurate scaling back of our 
space goals and objectives must be undertaken in 
accordance with the priorities described. 
More importantly, however, the Committee 
believes that the progress of any prograth with the 
ultimate, long-term objective of human exploration 
of Mars should be tailored to the availability of 
funding and not to some fixed date for accom-
plishment. This is not only because we cannot 
exactly predict costs, or the rate of progress of the 
revolutionary technology that will be required, but 
because we must ultimately limit the risk to pioneer-
ing astronauts. Clearly, their safety is of greater 
concern than meeting any challenging, but in truth 
arbitrary, schedule. 
Program Content 
For purposes of assessment, the civil space program 
can be categorized into space science, Mission to 
Planet Earth, Mission from Planet Earth, technology 
and launch systems. The following sections address 
these topics. 
Space Science. American scientists and engineers 
have used opportunities for access to space to 
advance human understanding of ourselves, our 
planet, our solar system, and our universe 	 from 
the discovery of the Van Allen belts to the establish-
ment of X-ray astronomy, from the high resolution 
photos of the planets, their satellites, and rings to 
the global weather monitoring and forecasting 
system, from the growth in a microgravity environ-
ment of very large crystals to the age-dating of the 
Moon with lunar samples, from the detailed map-
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ping of the Earth's polar ozone depletions to the 
precise measurement of the "Big Bang" residual 
radiation, from the discovery of the effects of 
microgravity on bone growth and healing in 
mammals to direct measurements of million-degree 
solar system plasmas, and from the discovery of the 
enigmatic, rare repeating gamma ray bursters to the 
finding of ancient and active volcanoes on other 
planets and satellites. These achievements and the 
understanding gained from them will continue to 
be one of the most significant products of the 
nation's investment in the civil space program. The 
cost of this effort, in recent years, has been on the 
order of 20 percent of NASA's budget (Figure 7). 
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Council. They include such factors as (a) the 
widening of research horizons in response to past 
accomplishments so that there are now more 
opportunities than can be accommodated by the 
available resources; (b) the space technology 
required to support new advances is often more 
costly and sophisticated than in the past; (c) the 
growing complexity of interactions between NASA 
and its larger and more diverse research community; 
and (d) program stretch-outs, delays and cancella-
tions that waste creative researchers' time, 
squander resources, and decrease flight opportuni-
ties. We believe that many of these reasons continue 
to exist. 
An underlying basis for the concern of the 
research community has been that the strategies, 
goals, objectives, and programmatic requirements of 
the research program have not been adequately 
distinguished from the parallel national objective of 
placing humans in space. 
Mechanisms are needed which alleviate the 
more serious of these problems so that the talents 
and capabilities of America's space researchers, both 
inside and outside of NASA, can be focused on 
substantive future opportunities. We strongly affirm 
the central role of research in the U.S. civil space 
program, hence -
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With so spectacular a set of achievements as a 
foundation, and with a substantial number of space 
projects underway, the U.S. space research enter-
prise should be healthy and flourishing. Yet discus-
sions with researchers within NASA and in the 
university community reveal that there is significant 
discontent and unease about what the future may 
hold for U.S. space research. The reasons for these 
concerns have been documented in some detail in 
the 1986 report entitled "The Crisis in Space and 
Earth Science" issued b y the NASA Advisory
Recommendation 1: That the civil space science 
program should have first priority for NASA 
resources, and continue to be funded at pproxi-
mately the same percentage of the NASA budget 
as at present (about 20 percent). 
We note that this recommendation carries with 
it the responsibility for the research community and 
NASA to use these resources in a prudent manner to 
carry out pioneering research. To do this, the 
research community must understand and appreci-
ate, as well as participate in, the planning and 
budgetary process. To facilitate execution of this 
recommendation, we propose - 
Recommendation 2: That, with respect to pro-
gram content, the existing strategic plan for 
science and applications research proposed by 
NASA with input from the science community be 
funded and executed. 
The present strategic plan provides appropriate 
balance to the research program that must be 
maintained across the disciplines, as well as across 
the methodologies for carrying out the research. In 
particular, an appropriate mix must be achieved 
among small, medium, and large projects. A trend
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toward the development of large projects has 
developed in recent years, driven bv several factors. 
These include the natural evolution in requirements 
of some research fields and the "new start" process 
employed by NASA, the Office of Management and 
Budget and the Congress for initiating projects to 
carry out research. This latter process sometimes 
encourages a "piling-on" of research objectives, as 
well as of researchers, in order to strengthen fiscal 
justification. An environment needs to be created 
that will encourage small, fast-paced projects as well 
as large projects and enable both to flourish. 
Research support activities, such as mission 
operations and data analysis programs, as well as 
many portions of the advanced technology develop-
ment program, represent the life blood of civil space 
research. These activities, together with sub-orbital 
balloon and rocket projects, are the centerpiece of 
university professor and student involvement with 
the civil space program. Such activities encourage 
substantial numbers of scientists and engineers, 
beyond those involved in hardware development for 
major space flight projects, to participate construc-
tively and creatively in the space program. 
We conclude, therefore, that Research and 
Analysis Programs, Mission Operations and Data 
Analysis Programs, and the Advanced Technology 
Development Programs should be viewed as equally 
essential to the overall research program as are 
hardware projects themselves; that a "fast track" 
procurement process be devised for such programs; 
and that the resources allocated to these support 
activities not be used as "contingenc y" resources for 
unexpected problems encountered on large flight 
projects. 
We view the overall management of the research 
program to be a key part of the responsibilities of 
NASA headquarters, and consider that the portion 
of this activity aimed at the outside research and 
engineering community can be strengthened. Such 
strengthening includes a reappraisal of the balance 
between work performed in academia and that 
performed within NASA itself At present, the 
process that allocates and transfers resources to non-
NASA institutions can cause the university commu-
nity to be at a disadvantage with respect to NASA 
center researchers and center-funded contractors, 
the latter sometimes having "umbrella" type 
contracts for research support to the centers. 
We urge that universities, other organizations, 
and their investigator teams be used increasingly as 
"prime" contractors for space research instruments 
and projects. 
We recognize that the implementation of this 
recommendation will vary from one research
discipline to another, as well as from project to 
project. But we submit that its implementation will 
considerably lessen the reporting burdens now 
required of researchers, will relieve NASA personnel 
of certain routine contract coordination functions, 
and will place the responsibilit y for the ultimate 
success of programs that fall into this category 
where it should be: squarel y with the investigator 
team. 
Mission to Planet Earth. NASA's Mission to 
Planet Earth includes the Earth Probes series, the 
Earth Observing System (EOS) and the EOS Data 
and Information System (EOSDIS) and geostation-
arv platforms. The mission promises a major step in 
the development of the science and technology of 
global remote sensing of our planet. The data that 
will be collected in the program are essential for 
documenting, understanding, and predicting global 
change. The enormous benefits of this information 
to society require that NASA ensure that the 
program is well designed and efficiently managed. 
Interagency and international contributions and 
cooperation will be key factors in the success of the 
program. Data management is of critical impor-
tance, as with most space programs. 
NASA planning for EOS as a contributor to the 
U.S. Global Change Research Program was re-
viewed by the National Research Council in early 
1990 and found to be generally consistent with the 
scientific requirements of that program. However, 
the review also notes several issues that remain to be 
addressed. Our Committee emphasizes the impor-
tance of NASA's Earth Probes program, which 
includes smaller, precursor missions to EOS and 
missions complementary to and contemporaneous 
with EOS. The Committee also emphasizes the 
importance of adequate funding for the evolution 
and operation of the EOS data and information 
system. 
As regards design of the Earth Observing 
System, the Committee supports the concept of 
simultaneous flight of instruments to address 
natural processes occurring on short time scales, and 
to facilitate intercalibration and environmental 
corrections. This approach leads to the requirement 
for a large spacecraft	 which is less costly on a per 
instrument basis. NASA has thus proposed two 
series of relativel y large platforms in polar orbit to 
implement EOS over a 15-year period. 
The NRC report mentioned above generally 
supports the concept of simultaneity for a group of 
instruments, the accompan ying need for at least one 
large spacecraft, and the general concept of long-
term measurements. But the report also notes that 
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many objectives could perhaps be achieved better 
and sooner with a series of smaller, independent 
satellites. Moreover, the Committee notes that the 
perception remains in the scientific community that 
the current proposal of a fixed configuration of two 
relatively
 large polar platforms may not be ideal for 
answering important questions yet to be clearly 
posed. Furthermore, compromises have to be made 
when many instruments fly on the same platform, 
and failures can lead to massive loss of data. Conti-
nuity and reliability of the data stream also are key 
factors for understanding global change, as is the 
considerable contribution of non-U.S. Earth-
observing activities. 
The Committee sees no reason to disagree with 
the NRC report, and concludes that the design of 
EOS must involve a variety of different spacecraft to 
meet so complex a set of requirements. In the end, 
a combination of different size spacecraft and 
surface-based platforms will be needed. Alternative 
approaches should be carefully examined so that the 
optimum approach can be selected to meet scientific 
objectives with continuity, reliability, and 
affordability. Particular diligence will be required to 
assure that the complexity of EOS is controlled. 
Data from environmental satellites operated by 
the NOAA, the Department of Defense and EOSAT 
all provide basic environmental information valuable 
to the Mission to Planet Earth. NASA's coordina-
tion with these ongoing programs is an essential 
element of the civil space program. 
The Committee recognizes that NASA's charter 
includes the development of new space capabilities, 
including remote sensing systems for environmental 
monitoring, but notes that NASA's role in the 
research and development for operational environ-
mental satellites has diminished in recent years. In 
our view, this trend should be reversed. We note 
that EOS and other components of Mission to 
Planet Earth can serve as a valuable testing ground 
for pre-operational instruments. Thus - 
Recommendation 3: That the multi-decade set of 
projects known as Mission to Planet Earth be 
conducted as a continually evolving program 
rather than as a mission whose design is frozen 
in time. A combination of different size space-
craft appears to be most appropriate to meet the 
needs of simultaneity, accuracy, continuity and 
robustness. NASA also should re-establish 
research and development in support of environ-
mental satellites to meet NOAA-stated require-
ments. NOAA, for its part, must budget ad-
equately to finance the operational costs of 
spacecraft and instruments, as well as related 
day-to-day support activities.
The Earth Observing System combines the 
characteristics of research and operational missions. 
The overall importance of the program to the nation 
and its dual character taken together enforce the 
need for high-level management attention. More-
over, considering that EOS will be the centerpiece, 
at least in terms of resources, for the U.S. Global 
Change Research Program, it is essential that the 
planning and decision making process encompass the 
full range of relevant agencies and the federal 
Committee on Earth and Environmental Sciences 
(CEES). The large size, broad scope and national 
importance of the program also suggest that the 
EOS funding be provided as a line item, separate 
from other science programs. This overall undertak-
ing demands continued attention at the policy level 
by the National Space Council. 
The Committee believes that a review of the 
decision-making process for Mission to Planet Earth, 
including its relation to the U.S. Global Change 
Research Program, should be carried out for the 
National Space Council by a group from govern-
ment, industry
 and academia, headed by the Direc-
tor of the Office of Science and Technology
 Policy 
(OSTP). The review should consider interagency 
aspects, the role of the CEES, and international 
dimensions, and make recommendations aimed at 
ensuring the success and continuity of the program. 
It has been proposed to the Committee that the 
current civil operational satellites, including NOAA 
environmental satellites and Landsat, could be 
operated more efficiently and cost-effectively if 
aggregated under a single commercial entity (espe-
cially when considered on a global basis). In this 
case, the federal government would access the data it 
requires and carry out the needed research and 
development, rather than actually operating the 
satellites. The international dimension is of clear 
interest in that it might be possible to develop an 
international consortium for remote sensing similar 
to Intelsat or Inmarsat. 
Consequentl y , the Committee urges that the 
National Space Council, together with OSTP and 
OMB, undertake a feasibility
 study to determine if a 
single commercial entity could provide more cost-
ef}ictivc management for operational environmental 
and land remote-sensing satellites. The prospects for 
an international consortium should be evaluated. 
NASA's experimental Landsat program was 
transferred to the Commerce Department in 1983 
with the expectation that the operation could be 
commercialized profitabl y . Virtually
 all parties to 
that expectation now agree, and international 
experiences veriR', that full commercialization of 
Landsat is not feasible for the foreseeable future.
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Moreover, the funding required to sustain the 
Report if the	 transfer has been subject to an annual threat of 
termination. Action must be taken to remed y this 
Advismy	 problem, or the U.S. shall lose both this important 
data and leadership in remote sensing 	 the latter 
Committee already under serious challenge. 
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Mission from Planet Earth. On July 20, 1989, 
the 20th Anniversary of the Apollo 11 Moon 
landing, President Bush proposed that the nation 
commit to a "sustained program of manned explora-
tion of the solar system," thereby initiating what has 
come to be called the Space Exploration Initiative 
(SET). In his remarks, the President recognized the 
Apollo program and all those who contributed to it, 
but also noted the transient nature of that program 
and the necessity not to be constrained to "brief 
encounters" in our future space exploration activi-
ties. Thus, the Space Exploration Initiative consists 
of robotic missions to the Moon and Mars, as well as 
the establishment of permanent outposts (not 
necessarily continuously inhabited) on the Moon 
and, later, human exploration of Mars. 
At some point, it will be necessary to set a 
specific date for the return to the Moon and, later, 
for the initial Mars landing. We believe that such a 
date can best be established at some future time. 
There is much planning yet to be done, enabling 
technologies be developed, key questions to be 
answered in the area of life sciences, and funding 
constraints to address. The question might then be 
asked: "If there is no timetable for the Mars 
landing, why is it necessary to establish a program 
and a set of goals at all?" We believe the answer is 
several-fold. First, an y large organization, such as 
NASA, generally works best when it has an 
overarching and challenging objective to guide its 
long-term future. This provides a focus and ratio-
nale for the large series of otherwise somewhat 
disconnected technological efforts which not only 
enable the eventual program, but also offer the 
resulting developments to all of our nation's space 
and non-space activities. Further, the existence of a 
long-term and evident goal helps make real the work 
of researchers and technologists 	 not to mention 
helping motivate talented young men and women to 
join NASA. 
It is possible, of course, to conceive of a space 
program without a long-term vision such as the 
human exploration of Mars; significant science 
would still be accomplished and the Earth's environ-
ment would still be monitored. But we would lose 
the jewel represented by the vision of a seemingly 
unattainable goal, the technologies engendered, and 
the motivation provided to our nation's scientists
and engineers, its laboratories and industries, its 
students and its citizens. Hence 
Recommendation 4: That the Mission from 
Planet Earth be established with the long-term 
goal of human exploration of Mars, underpinned 
by an effort to produce significant advances in 
space transportation and space life sciences. 
Recommendation 5: That the Mission from 
Planet Earth be configured to an open-ended 
schedule, tailored to match the availability of 
funds. 
To respond to this long-range exploration 
challenge, NASA must establish the framework 
within which to develop at least six new technology 
bases and program elements: (1) a modern eco-
nomical heavy lift launch vehicle; (2) a life sciences 
emphasis space station; (3) affordable, evolutionary 
interplanetary transportation systems; (4) auto-
mated lunar and Martian exploration; (5) extrater-
restrial resource utilization systems; and (6) reliable 
closed loop ecological life support systems. The 
planning for this undertaking will be a challenge 
that will require adequate time and, most important, 
outstanding human resources. Later in this report 
we suggest that a new position, Associate Adminis-
trator for Exploration, be established. This person, 
supported by his or her own Conceptual Systems 
Design team, should be responsible for planning, 
overseeing and integrating the six new technology 
bases and program elements required to carry out 
the Mission from Planet Earth. The first task must 
be to prepare an evolutionary , flexible long-range 
plan that starts with 2 1st Century operations on 
Mars and works backward to critical initial steps and 
realistic budgets. Immediate attention must be 
given to establishing a vigorous new space life 
sciences program, and eventually to planning for 
international participation in the Mission from 
Planet Earth. 
Space Station Freedom. We have elected to treat 
Space Station Freedom as the first step in the 
Mission from Planet Earth even though it has other 
valid uses, such as hands-on extended duration 
microgravitv research. The latter may have impor-
tant impact in the area of competitiveness, poten-
tially unlocking new developments in such fields as 
materials, electronics and biosciences. 
Space Station Freedom has now been in the 
design and development phase for three years and, if 
one includes the concept formulation phases, for 
eight years. Approximatel y $3.6 billion has been 
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expended on the project to date. Nonetheless, 
debate continues over its design concept and even its 
basic purpose. This has been exacerbated by 
concerns over the ability of the Space Shuttle to 
support Space Station Freedom. As of October, 
1990, the baseline plan for the initial block of Space 
Station Freedom required 18 Shuttle launches over 
roughly a four-year period, plus five logistics 
launches per year once the station is permanently 
occupied (five flights prior to the completion of the 
initial block). 
Aside from its role in life sciences, it does not 
appear to the Committee that any manned space 
station can be justified based solely upon the science 
it enables	 nor has this been claimed in the case of 
Space Station Freedom. Microgravity research is a 
significant and promising field of endeavor, although 
of unknown potential. It justifies some form of 
space platform for experimentation, but it is not, of 
itself, a sufficient justification for a manned space 
station. 
Likewise, we do not find compelling the case 
that a space station is needed as a transportation 
node for planetary exploration. First, many promis-
ing flight profiles do not appear to require such a 
node and, second, if the y did, the need in our 
judgment is sufficiently far in the future that we 
would hardly know today what to ask of such a 
terminal today. 
On the other hand, the Committee holds the 
strong conviction that if the U.S. is to have any 
significant long-term manned space program, a 
space station is the next logical and essential element 
of that endeavor. The most significant unknowns 
remaining in manned exploration reside in the area 
of life sciences. A manned, near-Earth laboratory is, 
in our judgment, the sensible place to begin address-
ing these crucial questions which sooner or later 
must and will be resolved	 by the U.S. or some 
other spacefaring nation. 
The need for the Space Station thus rests 
squarely upon life sciences experimentation and the 
development and verification of long duration space 
operating systems. These, together with its uses for 
microgravitv research and applications are, in our 
opinion, a more than sufficient justification for a 
space station. A space station is needed specifically 
to establish effective strategies to prevent or mitigate 
the debilitating deconditioning effects on humans of 
long stays in low gravity fields, and to establish 
absolutely reliable and efficient life support systems 
for extended human stays in unforgiving, hostile 
environments. A space station also can push the 
development and verification of durable robotic 
systems to monitor, maintain and repair complex
hardware systems in such environments. Finally, a 
space station can provide essential experience in the 
effective operation of large, technically sophisticated 
remote-from-Earth inhabited outposts. 
But do these needs demand a space station of 
the complexity of Space Station Freedom, particu-
larly given the limitation which has been imposed on 
funds for its development? Our answer, reluctantly, 
is that they do not. We say reluctantly because one 
of the most debilitating diseases a space program can 
acquire is a tendency to keep stopping and restarting 
in search of the ever elusive ideal solution
	 and 
we are disinclined to contribute to any such process. 
On the other hand, we concur that a modified 
design, along the general lines NASA is now consid-
ering, is mandatory. Thus, we propose 
Recommendation 6: That NASA, in concert with 
its international partners, reconfigure and 
reschedule the Space Station Freedom with only 
two missions in mind: first, life sciences experi-
mentation (including the accrual of operational 
experience on very long duration human activi-
ties in space) and, second, microgravity research 
and applications. In so doing, steps should be 
taken to reduce the station's size and complexity, 
permit greater end-to-end testing prior to 
launch, reduce transportation requirements, 
reduce extra-vehicular assembly and maintenance, 
and, where it can be done without affecting 
safety, reduce cost. The planned ninety days may 
prove an inadequate period of time to conduct so 
significant a reassessment. Such time as is 
required should be taken. 
The Committee believes that, wherever possible, 
integrated systems should be fully tested and verified 
on the ground. For example, the habitat and 
experimental modules should be tested and verified 
in their furnished and operational mode before 
launch. Systems that cannot be fully verified in one-
g should be tested and verified on orbit before 
permanent human occupancy. 
In addition, an assured crew return capabilit y for 
use in an emergency
 must also be operational prior 
to permanent human occupancy. Finally, reasonable 
margins in weight, power, crew assembly time, and 
crew maintenance time must be provided. 
Although warranting rcconhguration and 
probably rescheduling, the Space Station remains, in 
our judgment, the essential initial building block of 
the manned exploration program. 
The next goal for the manned exploration 
program is the establishment of permanent (al-
though not necessaril y continually inhabited)
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outposts on the Moon. This step is needed to learn 
how to live and work on the surface of an alien 
planet, but will also provide opportunities for 
geological and astronomical research. Particularly 
important will be the testing of habitats, closed 
ecological life support systems, and remote space- 
rated power plants; learning to process and use 
indigenous materials; observing the effects of living 
in extreme heat, cold and dust in low-gravit y fields; 
and developing reliable systems to provide radiation 
protection and surface mobility for humans and 
robots through 300 hour-long days and nights. 
The Moon's surface contains records of the 
ancient bombardment phase of planetary evolution 
in the solar system. Its cratered surface can tell us 
much about the Earth during the formative stages of 
the atmosphere and oceans. Erosion and plate 
tectonics have erased almost all evidence of this era 
from our planet. Lunar mineralogy, geochemistry, 
and stratigraphy on the front and far side of the 
Moon, with its diverse lava flows and mass concen-
trations, are fertile fields for research in comparative 
planetologv. The Moon's relationship to the Earth 
while our planet was forming may be discernable on 
the Moon. Many serendipitous discoveries will 
almost certainly be made, perhaps similar to the 
finding of meteorites in Antarctica. 
While substantial knowledge has been gained 
about the Moon and Mars over the history of space 
exploration, unknowns still pose questions and 
potential risks to intensive human exploration, 
unknowns such as the high latitude geography of 
the Moon, the concentration of water and useful 
minerals in Mars soil, etc. Some robotic reconnais-
sance or prospector missions will need to be defined 
and executed prior to manned explorations. There 
are also life sciences and space physics missions that 
may be necessary . Thus we propose
carriers, and modular space-based transfer vehicles 
with hydrogen-oxygen engines and aerobraking 
shields. Economical cargo transport beyond Earth 
orbit also is in prospect using low thrust, high 
specific impulse solar or nuclear thermal propulsion 
systems - with the propulsion- energy generators 
adding to the useful delivered payloads. 
Exploration Bases. The lunar program will be 
needed to gain experience in establishing and 
operating bases on remote bodies and to eventually 
understand how to live and work on the surface of 
an alien planet. Lunar and Martian habitation will 
also call for improved space suits; solar and nuclear 
electric generators in the 10 to 100 megawatt range; 
decentralized computers; automated plants to 
process indigenous materials; robotic construction 
machinery; and transportation and communication 
facilities. Lunar base prototype systems should be 
designed for adaptability to Martian conditions. 
Closed Loop Ecological Life Support. New, closed 
ecological life support systems (CELSS) will be 
necessary to sustain people living in extra-terrestrial 
bases. Air and water must be recycled, and nourish-
ing food produced within automated closed-cycle 
support systems. Air and water recycling is relatively 
straightforward, but little is known about construct-
ing reliable biospheres that can be depended upon 
for continuous automated production of food and 
organic materials, and the removal of toxins and 
contaminants. This is an excellent field for US-
USSR cooperative effort involving multi-disciplinary 
government and university laboratories. Of all the 
critical elements for long duration space flight, 
closed ecological systems remain among the least 
understood, and the most challenging. 
Recommendation 7: That technology be pursued 
which will enable a permanent, possibly man-
tended outpost to be established on the Moon 
for the purposes of exploration and for the 
development of the experience base required for 
the eventual human exploration of Mars. That 
NASA should initiate studies of robotic precur-
sor missions and lunar outposts. 
Interplanetary Transportation. Eventually it will 
be necessary to provide affordable transport to the 
Moon that can evolve later to extend space flight to 
Mars. A NASA sponsored "Synthesis Group" is 
currently investigating alternatives for these mis-
sions. Candidate conceptual system designs include 
automated electric propulsion/aerobraking cargo
Space Technology. Unlike research, which seeks 
new knowledge, technology is concerned with the 
application of that knowledge to useful purposes. 
The development of advanced technology is thus 
crucial to the success of the exploration and exploi-
tation of space	 whether human or robotic. Since 
NASA is a major consumer of space products, NASA 
bears part of the responsibility to assure the viability 
of the technology base upon which to build the 
missions of the future. 
The serious technological challenge for NASA 
at the present time does not relate to issues of 
invention or creativity, but rather to the difficult 
sequence of taking an invention and turning it into 
an engineered component, testing its suitability in 
space; and then incorporating it into a spacecraft 
system. In its early vears, NASA managed this 
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"technology insertion" phase particularl y well. But 
there is a widely-held opinion that although NASA 
continues to do excellent research, both in its 
centers and in its affiliated universities, the results of 
this work are not being efficiently transferred into 
applications - a fault, it must be said, that is shared 
with U.S. industry at large. A prime responsibility of 
the NASA technology development activity must be 
to bridge the gap between technology concepts and 
application to space practice. Prototype develop-
ments can be particularly important in this regard. 
Unfortunately, NASA has not been permitted to 
sustain an adequate level-of-effort program in space 
technology due in recent years to externally imposed 
budget reductions (Figure 8). We believe that this is 
a consequence of a lack of appreciation of the key 
role that technology development plays in enabling 
future missions, reducing future systems' costs and 
increasing America's competitiveness. It has, of 
course, been suggested from time to time that the 
budget for these activities is not spent effectively. 
Moreover, since most of the funding is expended 
within NASA, the university or industry constitu-
ency to provide political support for the program is 
limited. Both of these concerns can be alleviated if 
technology development programs are made 
competitive, such that they involve the best talent 
Figure N 
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wherever it may reside - including in other govern-
ment agencies where appropriate. In any event, this 
under investing trend must be reversed. lithe 
nation is to successfull y undertake challenging space 
initiatives in the future, we must reestablish our 
technology base today. 
Among the more critical technology topics that 
must be pursued are propulsion and aerodynamics 
including flight evaluations, advanced rocket engines 
that do not detrimentally impact our environment, 
aerobraking for orbital transfer, long duration closed 
ecosystems and life support systems, nuclear-electric 
space power, space tethers and artificial gravity, 
automation and robotics, information management 
systems, sensors, electric power generation, 
radiation protection and materials and in-space 
materials processing. 
Technology development can be considered in 
three phases, each of which warrants attention. The 
first is advanced and/or generic technology that may 
have broad applicability, such as innovations in data 
management and storage. The second is technology 
tied to specific programs, such as nuclear propulsion 
for the exploration program. The third consists of 
flight qualification of new technology. Each of these 
aspects needs to be handled in a different manner. 
In particular, we believe that technology which 
may have generic applicability should be developed 
under the auspices of the Associate Administrator 
responsible for advanced technology. The accompa-
nying planning effort should involve other appropri-
ate Associate Administrators having responsibilities 
for major future missions. These concerns lead 
us to 
Recommendation 8: That NASA, in concert with 
the Office of Management and Budget and 
appropriate Congressional committees, establish 
an augmented and reasonably stable share of 
NASA's total budget that is allocated to ad-
vanced technology development. A two- to 
three-fold enhancement of the current modest 
budget seems not unreasonable. In addition, we 
recommend that an agency-wide technology plan 
be developed with inputs from the Associate 
Administrators responsible for the major devel -
opment programs, and that NASA utilize an 
expert, outside review process, managed from 
headquarters, to assist in the allocation of 
technology funds. 
On a related issue, the Committee is particularly 
concerned over the low priority that has been given 
to the development of the life support technologies, 
and to the fundamental medical aspects of long 
duration space flight by humans. The scientific
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conimunitv and NASA are now in substantial 
agreement as to the steps that must to be taken to 
redress this shortcoming. However, responsibility 
for the conduct of research on these issues, which 
could affect the fundamental feasibilit y of space 
exploration by humans, currently is split between the 
Office of Space Science and Applications and the 
Office of Aeronautics, Exploration and Technology 
- as well as between two principal centers and 
several supporting centers. Such fragmentation is 
debilitating to what should he an urgent and 
focused research and development program. All 
flight-related life sciences research that is pursued 
should be considered technology development, and 
treated as such within the NASA organizational 
structure. 
The Associate Administrator for Exploration 
suggested later should be given the authority and 
responsibility for space human biology activities. 
Further, we advise that work in this important area 
be consolidated as far as possible into a single center, 
with research being contracted on a competitive 
basis wherever feasible. 
Space Infrastructure 
Space Transportation Systems. The most fundamen-
tal building block without which there can be no 
future space program is the transportation system 
which provides our access to space. All spacecraft 
and mission architectures are constrained b y the
characteristics of the vehicles that lift them into 
orbit. When things are going well in space trans-
portation, the space program seems to flourish; 
when space transportation is troubled, the entire 
space program languishes and any other error 
seemingly is magnified. 
The Committee finds that the most significant 
deficiency in the nation's future civil space program 
is an insufficiency of reliable, flexible and efficient 
space launch capability . The nation now needs to 
move ahead and attain a more robust launch 
capability. 
Along with its impressive and unique capabili-
ties, the Space Shuttle has shown itself to oe a 
complex system that is expensive to operate and 
whose emergence from developmental status has 
not yet taken place (Figure 9). The presence of the 
crew adds to its cost and perceived risk. The 
combination of these factors drives manpower 
requirements up, complicates payload design, and 
brings about the high cost of its operation (Figure 
10). Planned mission frequencies which are realistic 
and achievable are considered by the Committee to 
be essential to cost containment. 
The nation is at a critical juncture as we look 
ahead to consider how future space endeavors will 
he influenced and limited by what we decide now 
about Earth-to-orbit transportation. There is 
general agreement in all recent space transportation 
studies (e.g., the Defense Science Board and the 
Figure 9 
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NASA Advisory Council studies) that the nation 
needs a new heavy lift launch capability, but no 
implementing decision has resulted. These reports, 
combined with our concern about the heavy depen-
dence upon the Shuttle, point to the unalterable 
need for the initiation of a major national effort to 
develop a new launch system that can provide a 
flexible heavy lift capacity. Not only will an evolving 
space station need heavy lift support, but other 
missions also will benefit from reduced dependence 
upon the Space Shuttle. 
The first goal for a new Expendable Launch 
Vehicle (ELV) system should be to augment support 
of the Space Station. While the Shuttle might carry 
out some early Space Station deployment, alternative 
transportation should significantly reduce the cost 
and risk of that program. The time to make a 
commitment to this end is now, for the longer the 
nation delays the building of a new launch system, 
the greater is the risk that it wilt embark upon a 
space station and a subsequent manned exploration 
program that eventually could prove unsupportable. 
There is a range of choices available for a heavy 
lift vehicle (circa 150,000 pounds to near-Earth 
orbit). One candidate would be some form of a 
Space Shuttle-derived ELy, but there are others. At 
the extremes, a dilemma lies in choosing between 
starting the heavy lift system design from a "clean 
sheet," or selecting a design closel y related to the 
current Shuttle (e.g., a Shuttle-C). The latter
provides an earlier capability with less initial cost, but 
the former provides an opportunity for the revolu-
tionary design of a completely new launch system 
incorporating up-to-date propulsion and support 
system technology . Assessment of the economics, 
the lack of firm Department of Defense require-
ments, the need to further define lunar/Mars 
payloads, the status of advanced launch system 
technologies, and long propulsion lead times are all 
important considerations as the choices are weighed. 
On balance, the Committee concludes that the 
prudent choice - with an eye toward both the 
Space Station and the long view - is an approach 
that begins with a new ELV system that meets the 
following criteria: 
• Operational capability must be achieved in time to 
support at least the latter stages of Space Station 
deployment and relieve its Shuttle dependence as 
soon as feasible. 
• Launch support manpower must be reduced. 
• Provision should be made for updating with new 
components as they become available from the 
joint NASA-DOD Advanced Launch System 
(ALS) technology development. In particular, the 
Space Transportation Main Engine should be 
introduced into the new launch system at the 
earliest appropriate time. 
This should be the first phase of a continuing 
effort to upgrade Earth-to-orbit transportation. 
Some time hence, further advancements in lift 
capability can be achieved when justified by require-
ments and technical developments. In particular, 
this second phase should involve ongoing application 
of technologies developed in the ALS program, and 
should lead to the design of an advanced launch 
vehicle and support system of enhanced efficiency 
and reliability. 
The Committee believes that the U.S. should 
not plan to depend on any foreign launch capability 
(such as the Soviet Energia, as some have proposed) 
to support critical U.S. space programs. 
The following summarize our conclusions with 
respect to launch capability - 
Recommendation 9: That the Administration 
promptly establish and fund a firm program for 
development of an evolutionary, unmanned but 
man-rateable, heavy lift launch vehicle. This 
system should reach operational capability in 
time to support all but the initial phase of the 
Space Station deployment. 
NASA and the Air Force should continue a 
vigorous Advanced Launch System technology 
program to support both near-term and follow-on
Report oft/u

Advisory
Committee
on the
Future of the
U.S. Space
Program 
33
Re-port t iI'i 
Advisom 
heavy lift requirements. Highest priority in the 
launch vehicle technology effort should be assigned 
to the Space Transportation Main Engine (STME). 
Once a better definition of the lunar and Mars 
architecture and mission requirements is established, 
this advanced technology can be infused into a new 
vehicle design. 
In the meantime, because of continued depen-
dence upon the Space Shuttle, NASA should execute 
its plan to enhance the reliability and safety of this 
vehicle and to reduce launch costs. The examination 
already underway of the launch preparation process 
should be pursued with vigor. Consideration should 
be given to the possibility that a stable flight rate 
planning factor including greater margins might, of 
itself, facilitate the implementation of cost (man-
power) savings. 
The issue has arisen as to whether NASA should 
procure another Space Shuttle Orbiter to provide a 
more robust five-vehicle fleet. The Committee does 
not support such a procurement at this time. The 
Committee appreciates that we may lose another 
orbiter before the proposed new unmanned heavy 
lift launch vehicle is completely developed, and that 
this would once again result in a fleet of only three 
operational Space Shuttles, as has been the case since 
1986. But, as of the present, we conclude that any 
decision to procure another orbiter should be 
deferred and funding for the unmanned launch 
vehicle given priority. In the meantime, the current 
NASA practice of procuring structural spares should 
continue in support of the existing Space Shuttle 
fleet. 
Recommendation 10: The Committee recom-
mends that the procurement of an additional 
Space Shuttle orbiter, for a five-orbiter fleet 
operation, not be undertaken at this time, but 
spares procurement should continue. If an 
orbiter is lost in the relatively near future, the 
decision on whether to procure another orbiter 
should be made in the context of the availability 
of the new heavy lift launch vehicle and the 
demands on the remaining orbiter fleet.
a two-way, transportation capability on a man-
rateable EL' for use in the event of a Space Shuttle 
stand-down. Although full t,.vo-wav capability max' 
be neither affordable nor practical in the near-term, 
design and development of an emergency recovery 
system can protect an option for later expansion to 
provide a two-way capability on an expedited basis. 
This or some other approach to a redundant 
personnel transportation, to which NASA could 
turn in the circumstance posed, is regarded as 
worthy of attention. 
Recommendation 11: That NASA initiate design 
effort so that manned activity in the Space 
Station could be supported in the absence of the 
Space Shuttle. Crew recovery capability must be 
available immediately, and provision made for 
the relatively rapid introduction of a two-way 
personnel transport module on a selected ex-
pendable launch vehicle. 
National Acro Space Plane (NASP). It would be 
premature at this point to expect the NASP to play a 
contributing operational role in Space Station or 
other orbital support missions for the next 15 to 20 
years. Nevertheless, the long-term potential for this 
unique combination of aerospace technologies could 
be significant. Use of the hypersonic air-breathing 
propulsion technique for acceleration of space 
qualified vehicles as an upper stage from high 
subsonic to orbital velocities offers altogether new 
capabilities. Once in orbit, such platforms might 
dip into the atmosphere and use their aerodynamic 
properties to generate an orbital plane change, then 
be boosted back into orbit by the scramjet engine 
using the atmosphere to supply the needed oxygen. 
In spite of the NASP's long-term potential, the 
Committee generally endorses the view of the 
Defense Science Board which, in March, 1990, 
suggested that, at least in the foreseeable future, the 
NASP's single -stage -to-orbit concept may have 
been over-emphasized. The more important aspect 
of this program is its development of air-breathing 
hypersonic propulsion capability. 
U.S. Spa 
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Alternate Personnel Transportation. The emer-
gency recovery capability now planned for the Space 
Station is essential. However, with the exception of 
the crew recovery system, plans do not now call for a 
fully redundant personnel transportation capability 
to assure that manned activit y can continue if the 
Space Shuttle is grounded for an extended period. 
In light of this situation, the Committee believes a 
rescue vehicle should be designed and, as a contin-
gency, provision made for expedited development of
Even so, the relatively modest expenditures 
needed to move the NASP initiative briskly 
forward towards a technology demonstration 
flight program with an X-vehicle are worthwhile, 
given the potential for a major breakthrough 
capability. This is exactly the kind of revolution-
ary program NASA should undertake, although 
we do not assign it high schedule urgency. 
34
Management 
We believe that the management hierarchy of 
the Civil Space Program, within the Executive 
Branch should be: the National Space Council, to 
provide policy direction; NASA headquarters, to 
provide executive management; project offices to 
provide specific project direction; and centers to 
offer day-to-day program implementation and 
supervision of supporting contractors from the 
private sector and academia. 
Various models were examined by the Commit-
tee whereby major responsibilities might be shifted 
from NASA to other organizations, somewhat along 
the lines of the Department of Defense's Strategic 
Defense Initiative Organization, government 
corporations, the Department of Energy Laborato-
ries, etc. With the possible exception of the ex-
panded use of Federall y Funded Contract Research 
and Development Centers, discussed later, the 
Committee believes that such action would be 
counterproductive. The fact is that NASA remains 
the world's greatest repository of space knowledge 
and experience. Thus, efforts should be devoted to 
its improvement, not its dismemberment. The 
Committee concludes - 
That NASA should continue to be the nation's 
principal agent for carrying out its civil space 
program, under policy guidance from the Space 
Council, and drawing as appropriate on other 
government resources and the capabilities of the 
private sector and academia. 
External Oversight. No examination of civil space 
management issues can consider NASA in isolation, 
because numerous interfaces exist with other parts 
of the government, many of which, by law, enable 
policy direction, funding, management constraints 
and oversight. Much of this infrastructure has 
existed since the formation of NASA, including 
legislative oversight and the existence of a National 
Space Council, originally mandated by the National 
Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958. But 30 years of 
executive and legislative change have taken their toll 
on the smoothness of many of these interfaces. 
In the heads' days of the early space program, 
with its emphasis on catching and surpassing the 
Soviet space program, NASA was afforded extraordi-
nary latitude by the Congress. Exceptions were 
made to the generall y applicable civil service regula-
tions to permit NASA to attract and retain the very 
best of the nation's technical talent. Financial and
budgetary controls were designed to give the 
Administrator the flexibility to operate fast-moving 
programs, e.g., "no-year" funding. Similarly, the 
agency was granted important powers for procure-
ment, unfettered by
 such later controls as, for 
example, the act which now places stringent con-
straints on the agency's ability to acquire computer 
systems. 
Executive Branch. Over the years, policy guidance 
to NASA, and the integration of NASA activities 
with other technological, scientific, political and 
national security responsibilities of the U.S. govern-
ment, have been accomplished in a variety of ways. 
The management process has now come full circle 
to a new National Space Council, re-enacted in 1988 
and implemented by Executive Order on 1 March 
1989. Prior to the establishment of this new 
Council, the policy generation mechanism was a 
combination of a Senior Interagency Group (SIG-
Space) and a working group of the Economic Policy 
Council - an arrangement that most considered 
unsatisfactory. 
Various ad hoc groups have wrestled with the 
matter of setting space policy. One of the more 
thoughtful recent analyses was conducted by the 
Center for Strategic and International Studies. This 
study recommended that the NASA Administrator 
also serve as Director of Civil Space (DCS— some-
what equivalent to the Director of Central Intelli-
gence (DCI) in the intelligence community). While 
implementation of this proposal would not change 
the role of the Space Council, it would accentuate 
the important role the head of NASA could and 
should perform in assisting with the establishment of 
overall policy, coordinating vital national security 
interfaces, and integrating all civil space activities 
(Figure 11). This arrangement recognizes that 
virtually no governmental civil space pursuit can 
succeed without the support and participation of 
NASA, but it also recognizes the importance of 
coordination with the space endeavors of other 
government agencies. Indeed, as applications of 
space capabilities increase, coordination will become 
more and more essential. 
Although the "DCS concept" has many attrac-
tive aspects, we do not believe that it has received 
sufficient scrutiny to warrant endorsement at this 
time. Instead, we propose it for consideration by the 
Vice President in his role as Chairman of the Space 
Council. 
We are also persuaded that the membership of 
the Space Council, as provided for in the Executive 
Order of 20 April 1989, is sufficiently large that its
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treatment of mans' relativel y routine issues could be 
facilitated by the establishment of an executive 
committee. Hence—
Recommendation 12: That a Space Council 
Executive Committee, chaired by the Vice 
President and consisting of the Administrator of 
NASA, the Directors of the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget and the Office of Science and 
Technology Policy, the Secretary of Defense and 
the Director of Central Intelligence, be institu-
tionalized. Other Space Council principals 
should participate in the Space Ex-Comm 
meetings when appropriate, at the invitation of 
the Chairman. Major issues would continue to 
be addressed by the Space Council as a whole. 
The Committee notes also that, because of the 
increasing potential for contributions by NASA to 
America's economic competitiveness, it may be 
appropriate for the Administrator of NASA to serve 
Figure 11
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Total Civil Space Budget: $11.49 Billion 
Source: National Space Council 1990 Report to the President
as a member (or ex-officio member) of The 
President's Council on Competitiveness. 
Leqislntii'c Branch. The Committee believes that 
space program planning and execution could 
benefit to a significant degree byrefinements in 
Congressional operations related to program 
approval, resource allocation and oversight. The 
evident need for greater program stability could be 
furthered by more comprehensive Congressional 
debate backed by more accurate programmatic 
information (especially cost) prior to the time 
significant commitments are made	 and then 
greater diligence, absent substantive programmatic 
changes, to preserving planned funding profiles. 
Such intensified initial examination should focus on 
the specific justification for objectives, affordability, 
timing, implementation policies and technical risks. 
Congress should demand clarification of any 
proposal or element considered inadequately 
defined and substantiated, and also devote attention 
to options and alternatives. 
We believe NASA should develop a 10-year plan 
to provide Congress with sufficient information on 
objectives and implementation approaches to permit 
sound initial budget decisions. Most importantly, 
this plan should provide cost information, based on 
straightforward and understandable assumptions, 
including the costs of development, launch and 
operations. 
Once a program is approved, however, the 
Congress can and should help provide program 
stability through consistent and adequate funding. 
The successful management of multi-year develop-
ment programs is extremely sensitive to this conti-
nuity. Thus, we strongl y endorse the use of multi-
year funding and "no-year" appropriations when-
ever appropriate, to provide program stability and 
reduce costs. 
Internal Management. The Committee recognizes 
NASA's past effectiveness in mobilizing govern-
ment-academia-industrv teams to achieve a remark-
able set of accomplishments over more than three 
decades. NASA also has been responsive to a 
considerable flow of external recommendations, 
some of which were precipitated by reviews follow-
ing the Challenger accident. With the implementa-
tion of recommended "recovery" steps now substan-
tially completed, however, the Committee has 
viewed its primary responsibility as that of identify-
ing opportunities that will strengthen NASA's 
management capabilities for the future. 
The Committee strongly believes that the 
internal management structure of NASA is best 
determined by those having the ultimate responsi-
bilitv for the Agency's performance. Therefore, we 
do not offer firm recommendations in this area. 
Nevertheless, there are a number of observations 
that we consider worth' of serious consideration by 
NASA management, and these are offired below. 
Headquarters Functions. 
Systems Concepts and Analysis. The Administrator 
and his senior staff have an increasing need for the 
provision of both policy formation support and 
independent anal yses, not only in the formulative 
stages of programs but also as an ongoing review 
function. Increasingl y there will be issues that cut 
across organizational and programmatic boundaries. 
Thus, particularl y in the earl y conceptual phases of 
programs, there will be an increased need for 
systematic reviews of requirements and benefits. 
The analysis function proposed below should 
provide the Administrator with independent exper-
tise to generate and assess alternative approaches to 
program objectives, and to balance these objectives 
against overall national goals. The existence of this 
group of perhaps some 30 highly qualified individu-
als should also stimulate improved planning and 
program coherence throughout the agency. 
It will be difficult to recruit this senior systems 
engineering and analysis capability entirely from 
within NASA given the constraints on personnel 
transfers, and almost impossible to recruit it from 
outside of NASA due to the constraints of current 
civil service salary regulations. Accordingly, we 
propose 
That a Systems Concepts and Analysis Group be 
formed in the NASA headquarters to serve the 
Administrator. This group would consist of a 
small, elite civil service staff supplemented by a 
new or existing Federally Funded Research and 
Development Center (FFRDC). (Item A.) 
Such a center could possibl y
 he affiliated with a 
university, or not-for-profit institution but an 
industrial affiliation would not be appropriate under 
most circumstances. The practices of the Depart-
ment of Defense in using such centers should be 
considered. 
Independent Cost Analysis. NASA as well as other 
agencies of the government have been embarrassed 
from time to time by less than accurate estimates of 
project costs. The causes are well understood, and 
include program initiation before enabling technol-
ogy is proven, overselling on the part of program 
advocates, both in government and industry , and 
failure to include all costs when evaluating a pro-
gram. With programs becoming ever more costly 
and complex, it now appears to be an appropriate
time for the Administrator to have access to a highly 
skilled and independent cost estimating and analysis 
capability. Again, top-notch specialized personnel 
will be required, perhaps 20 in number, but in this 
case recruitment should not be inordinately difficult. 
However, this group must be capable of utilizing 
modern approaches for assessing the costs of complex 
advanced technology systems manufactured tinder a 
variety of management and business strategies. In 
short, we suggest 
That an independent cost analysis group be 
formed to serve the Administrator and the 
Administrator's staff. This group should be 
charged with the responsibility of providing to 
the Administrator a recommendation on all 
significant cost estimates provided to the Con-
gress or to the Office of Management and Bud-
get. Their cost estimating procedures should 
include contingency analysis techniques. 
(Item B.) 
Exploration. Exploration of the solar system, using 
both unmanned and manned systems, has been and 
will continue to be a core mission of NASA. Since 
the nation's first extra-terrestrial probe, Pioneer IV in 
1959, exploration activities have been distributed 
across various NASA Associate Administrators 
(Science, Manned Space Flight, etc.) While achiev-
ing great success in lunar and planetary exploration, 
we continue to encounter uncertainties regarding the 
appropriate use of manned vs. robotic exploration, 
and the legitimacy of science as a rationale for 
exploration. In reality, exploration will he a con-
tinuuni of robotic missions preceding the presence of 
man, and science will continue to be a strong 
rationale for exploration
	 but certainly not the 
only motivation. For these reasons, we believe it is 
time to consolidate the exploration activities of the 
agency under a single Associate Administrator. We 
propose, therefore 
That an Associate Administrator for Exploration 
be established with responsibility for both 
robotic and manned exploration of the Moon 
and Mars, the humans-in-space portion of life 
sciences studies, and technological foundations 
for manned and unmanned exploration of the 
Moon and Mars. (Item C.) 
Space Station. The Report of the NASA Manage-
ment Study
 Group in 1986 recommended that the 
Space Shuttle and the Space Station be placed under 
a single Associate Administrator. This was accom-
plished in the Office of Space Flight. The rationale 
for this recommendation was the perceived close
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interdependence between the Space Shuttle and the 
Space Station. We have concluded that it is time to 
reassess that decision. Together, these two programs 
represent 47 percent of the 1991 NASA budget, but 
they are in very different phases of their program life 
cycle, demand different management skills, and 
impose different pressures for attention upon 
management. Furthermore, while there are indeed 
important interfaces between the two programs, the 
reconfiguration of the Space Station should ensure 
that these interfaces become relatively more straight-
forward. 
As will be noted in the next section, we suggest 
that operations be separated from development. 
Accordingly, we propose that the Space Station 
program be grouped with other space flight develop-
ments such as the Advanced Solid Rocket Motor 
(ASRM), the Alternate Crew Recovery System 
(ACRS) and the development of a new heav y lift 
launch vehicle. With regard to Space Station mission 
requirements, we suggest that the Associate Admin-
istrator for Exploration serve as focal point. Thus, it 
is proposed - 
That the Space Station and other space flight 
development programs report to a NASA Associ-
ate Administrator for Space Flight Development. 
(Item D.) 
Space Flight Operations. The conduct of civil space 
flight operations, and the dominant role of the Space 
Shuttle, was raised continually during our delibera-
tions by knowledgeable individuals and groups with 
strong interest in NASA and the national space 
program. Their comments frequently referred to the 
consuming effect this responsibility can have on 
NASA's senior management, limiting the time 
available for the planning and direction of leading-
edge technological developments. A belief also was 
expressed that the merging of operations into a 
largely developmental organization does not foster 
the building of a professional operations cadre which 
can best manage this vital responsibility . Solutions 
proposed for this dilemma included the transfer of 
Space Shuttle operations to some to-be-determined 
"other government agency," such as a quasi-
government corporation, or to the private sector. 
A clear statement of the problem appears in a 
1988 National Academ y of Public Administration 
report entitled, "Effectiveness of NASA Headquar-
ters", as follows: "We have. . . concluded that the 
term "operational" as applied to commercial aircraft, 
to ships, or to mass-produced articles of defense will 
most likely never apply to space systems in that same 
context. What we do see, however, are large, 
complex space systems such as the Shuttle and the
Space Station that are or will be largely driven by 
operational issues - turnaround time between 
flights, manifesting, retrofitting of design changes 
for safety, cost or payload capability purposes, 
logistics, training of basic and science crew mem-
bers, and so on. These are not the basic work of 
research and development leading to new concepts 
and ideas for future space systems, nor for expand-
ing knowledge of the universe and discerning the 
implications of that knowledge for life on this planet 
or elsewhere." The report goes on to recommend 
an organizational separation, from the top of the 
agency down, on the two matters of space flight 
operations and space system development. 
We endorse this approach, including the estab-
lishment of an Associate Administrator for Space 
Flight Operations. The responsibilit y of this indi-
vidual should include Space Shuttle operations, ELV 
operations, and the Tracking and Data Systems 
organization. This Associate Administrator should 
have the institutional responsibilit y for injecting 
operational requirements into new programs to 
assure that they can be effectively operated over their 
lifetimes at reasonable cost. At the appropriate time, 
the responsibility for Space Station operations would 
also be assigned to this office. It is thus proposed—
That an Associate Administrator for Space Flight 
Operations be established whose responsibilities 
initially would include Space Shuttle operations, 
existing ELV operations, and tracking and data 
functions. Prior to implementing any such 
change, a detailed transition plan should be 
prepared and afforded full safety review and 
approval. (Item E.) 
Current and possible headquarters organiza-

tional alignments are summarized in Figures 12 and 
13. 
Shuttle Optrations. Management mechanisms now 
used to bring senior supervision and discipline to 
bear on Space Shuttle operations reflect the special 
emphasis that this has received in the last few years. 
Although occasional launch dela ys still occur, a 
process appears to be in place which surfaces 
concerns and resolves them. On the other hand, the 
Shuttle launch operation has evolved into a relatively 
slow and deliberate process, and we conclude that 
the laborious and labor intensive methods now 
employed may become a limiting factor in achieving 
the planned flight rates. Further, it is not likel y that 
the Space Shuttle will ever emerge from the inher-
ently expensive quasi-developmental stage unless 
responsibility is eventuall y moved from a develop-
ment oriented center to the operationall y oriented 
Kennedy Space Center (KSC). Such a move would
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appear logical since maturation of Space Shuttle 
operations drives the focus of program activities 
toward KSC as flight rates increase. This transfer of 
support responsibility to KSC should include the 
concentration and centralization of as much of the 
program management from other locations as is 
feasible, including from headquarters. 
Such a major move should be carefully imple-
mented only when a reasonable and regular flight 
rate has been re-established, but the Committee is 
persuaded that now is the time to begin planning the 
process. The ultimate goal should be a safe opera-
tion, performed as eflIcientiv and routinely as its 
complexity permits, and not burdened b y excessive 
layers of management that are the legacy of the 
development era and recovery from the Challenger 
accident. Particular attention must be paid to 
management accountability at each stage of the 
transfer process. We conclude that 
NASA should begin the deliberate process of 
planning for the transition of the Space Shuttle 
from development to a more nearly operational 
status at Kennedy Space Center with continuing 
technical support from other centers, and with 
appropriate certification of safety considerations 
at each step of the transfer process. (Item F.) 
Project Ma iiagc;nc;i t. There is general agreement 
that projects should be assigned to, and largely 
performed by, a single center whenever possible. 
Nevertheless, there will always be some projects that 
demand assignment to more than one center because 
of the size of the projects and the necessity to draw 
on diverse expertise. 
NASA has tried various approaches to this 
management challenge, ranging from headquarters 
project management to several forms of lead center 
arrangements. We submit, however, that day-to-day 
project management should not be performed from 
headquarters. It is not a natural function for an 
headquarters organization; people are not, and 
should not, be present within a headquarters in 
adequate numbers to staff such a function; the 
headquarters skill mix is inappropriate to project 
management; and the attempt to perform day-to-day 
project management undermines the critical over-
sight role that is a proper function of a headquarters 
staff.
Instead, we propose 
That NASA adopt as standard for the manage-
ment of multi-center programs, a headquarters 
project manager and staff located at or near the 
"Primary Center" involved in the undertaking. A
key attribute of such a project office would be 
its systems engineering capability. (Item G.) 
This approach will preserve the integrity of the 
headquarters supervisory function while providing 
the project manager with the technical, administra-
tive, and systems engineering support he or she will 
require. 
Center Ma,iaqcment. As NASA evolved during the 
decade of the 1960s, the missions of each center 
were relatively crisp and their respective capabilities 
developed into centers of excellence. To a large 
extent, these roles still exist and in many cases 
centers of excellence still prevail. But the focus has 
become somewhat blurred, for reasons that are 
generally well understood. With the phase-down 
following Apollo, several centers found their future 
prospects greatly diminished and sought additional 
work that could keep their talented staffs employed. 
As significant competence built up across centers in 
a variety of fields, diversification was sometimes 
even encouraged by headquarters program manag-
ers seeking competition between centers for new 
work. 
The issue in this case is whether center responsi-
bility overlap is appropriate in disciplines such as 
astrophysics, Earth sciences, microgravity and life 
sciences. The answer is no. Such diversification is 
inimical to a vigorous agency moving into new areas 
of space exploration. Each element of diversifica-
tion requires additional (scarce) knowledgeable 
management, facilities and funding, and represents 
a corresponding diversion from the center's core 
mission. Hence 
Recommendation 13 : That NASA management 
review the mission of each center and consoli-
date and refocus centers of excellence in cur-
rently relevant fields of science and technology 
with minimum overlap between centers. An 
appropriate balance between in-house and 
external activity also should be developed. 
Internal/External Division of Labor. Over the 
ears, NASA has developed a characteristic manage-
ment style in the conduct of its research and 
development activities. Its approach was originally 
nurtured by the groups from which NASA was 
formed (primarily the NACA centers and Army 
space activities) and was institutionalized during 
NASA's first decade, when external space expertise 
hardly existed, and an aerospace industry had vet to 
be developed from airframe companies, their 
suppliers, and a nascent electronics industry. A 
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supportive academic infrastructure also had vet to 
be generated. In this period, it was necessary for 
NASA to perform a great deal of work in-house, 
and to provide a substantial degree of oversight to 
the newl y formed "space -industrial -academic 
complex." 
We believe that it is time to reconsider this 
management style, and to identify improvements 
that are relevant and necessary as the civil space 
program enters the next decade of research, devel-
opment and exploration. Clearl y, one very impor-
tant advantage of NASA's approach is the existence 
of a staff with the ability to "buy smart" by virtue of 
hands-on experience. But the environment has 
changed. There is now a large and experienced 
space-academic community and an industrial base 
whose skills are broad and deep. The Department 
of Defense sponsored National Security Space 
Program is almost twice the size of NASA's pro-
gram, but operates with only limited in-house 
laboratory support, and there is now an infant but 
developing commercial space industry. 
NASA's civil service complement has remained 
relatively constant since the Apollo tail-off. On the 
other hand, in recent years this staff has been 
considerably augmented by the use of support 
service contractors (Figures 14 and 15). Issues that 
Figure 14 
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warrant consideration in this regard include: (1) 
What is an appropriate division of responsibilities 
between government and support contractor 
personnel?; and (2) Is such an organizational 
structure appropriate for NASA's emerging future 
responsibilities? Management's. reassessment of this 
situation should recognize that some "hands-on" 
work must be retained as an important part of each 
center's responsibility . Legitimate functions include 
the mandate to push the frontiers of space science 
and technology continuously forward, as well as to 
train the future managers of large, complex space 
systems. But this should not be taken to mean that 
NASA must continue a substantial effort in every 
space-related field. Rather, NASA should focus its 
hands-on activities on the relevant emerging and 
strategic technologies, on tasks not able to be 
readily pursued elsewhere, and on the oversight of 
its contractors. 
Turning to issues related to procurement, 
NASA, the national security organizations and 
various commercial entities all use different ap-
proaches to the conduct of this function. No single 
approach is correct for all situations. The Commit-
tee has noted, however, marked differences with 
respect to the staffing of the procurement operation 
within NASA. For instance, a typical national 
security space system will be managed by a program 
office of some 30 to 50 people augmented with 
either a Federally Funded Research and Develop-
ment Center (FFR1)C), a systems integration 
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contractor for technical and systems engincering 
support, or a prime contractor from industry. 
NASA, on the other hand, typically utilizes a 
corresponding prograni office which relies on center 
laboratories for technical support. In general, many 
more people are involved in NASA's approach, and 
certainly more government people. NASA technical 
staff members have remarked that contract oversight 
duties now consume a disproportionate amount of 
their time; time that the y believe would be more 
beneficiall y devoted to hands-on work. Some 
centers address this concern by instituting a career 
branch point at which an experienced engineer or 
scientist can choose between remaining at the 
"bench," or becoming more involved with manage-
ment. This approach helps assure a continuum of 
"smart buyers." However, we believe that - 
NASA should concentrate its "hands-on" 
expertise in those areas unique to its mission, 
and avoid the excessive diversion of technical or 
mission specialists to functions which could be 
performed elsewhere. Contract monitoring is 
best accomplished by a cadre of professional 
systems managers with appropriate experience. 
Increased use of performance requirements, 
rather than design specifications, will further 
increase the effectiveness of this approach. 
(Item H.) 
J)J.)(Jf J
• jJJjj t Polic y. The critical issue of federal 
procurement policy has been addressed repeatedly 
by numerous panels and commissions for at least a 
quarter of a century . The Committee concludes 
that were the findings of these past reports to be 
implemented, a sufficient basis would be provided 
for improving the procurement system. Hence, no 
further detailed recommendations arc made here. 
Worthy of note, however, is the fact that since 
1965, more than 60 new procurement-related 
public laws have been enacted. In addition, 25 
Executive Orders, 16 Office of Management and 
Budget Circulars, and 24 Office of Federal Procure-
ment Policy Letters have been issued, all of which 
affect the procurement process directly. 
With few exceptions, none of these laws, orders 
or circulars distinguishes between the procurement 
of routine housekeeping or office supplies and state-
of-the-art technology, hardware, or services. Al-
though it was not within the scope of the Commit-
tee to judge the merits of these regulations, we were 
repeatedly advised that their cumulative effect was to 
lengthen, complicate and increase costs associated 
with the procurement process. We also noted 
numerous instances where direction, reports and 
limitations were included in annual authorization
and appropriation acts that targeted the procure-
ment and management processes. Each year such 
instructions add to the cumulative administrative 
and cost burdens. We conclude, therefore 
That the Legislative and Executive Branches 
should review the combined effect of current 
laws, executive orders and circulars on the 
efficiency of high-technology research and 
development operations. After review, pilot test 
acquisitions should be conducted with as many 
of the non-critical, procurement-related objec-
tives removed as possible. The intent should be 
development of a more efficient process permit-
ting both swift technical progress and sound 
business management. The results of the study 
and the pilot tests should be reported to the 
President and the Congress. Appropriate actions 
by the Legislative and Executive Branches should 
be recommended. (Item I.) 
Commercial Programs. At the time of its forma-
tion in 1958, NASA was assigned responsibilities 
extending well beyond the conduct of individual 
space missions. These responsibilities included 
enhancing the technical competitiveness of the U.S. 
in space-related industries, and the transfer of space-
derived technologies into all appropriate elements of 
American industry. 
The direct application of space technology to 
the public good and to the economic benefit of the 
nation's industries began almost at the outset of the 
Space Age when Tiros 1, the first weather satellite, 
and Echo I, the first communication satellite, were 
launched in 1960. The communication satellite 
industry rapidly became an important commercial 
commodity in the international marketplace. 
Recognizing the growing importance of 
satellites and other possible commercial space 
products and services to the nation's competitive 
position, the Administration and the Congress 
expanded the scope of the Space Act in 1984 to 
require that NASA, together with its previously 
assigned duties regarding the development and 
transfer of space technologies, now additionally 
"seek and encourage to the maximum extent 
possible the fullest commercial use of space." The 
agency is thus charged with actively fostering a 
commercial space industry in much the same way as 
its predecessor NACA promoted (and NASA still 
promotes) the nation's broadl y successful aviation 
industry. The Committee feels strongly the impor-
tance of the government's aggressively pursuing and 
meeting this responsibility to encourage space 
commercialization because: 
• Domestic commercial space companies have 
grown to annual revenues exceeding $3.5 billion
in just three decades; thus their products and 
services represent an increasingl y
 important 
economic sector in the world marketplace; 
The U.S. cannot remain competitive in space 
technologies common to the world market unless 
private sector companies have and can sell high-
technology
 products; correspondingl y , only 
private capital can bring space technologies to 
bear on the national objective of improving the 
U.S. competitive position in the world trade; and 
Unlike the mature communications satellite 
industry , many areas of plausible space commer-
cialization still are in their infancy, and thus will 
require additional support from the government 
before returns to the private sector can be 
reasonabl y expected. 
The Committee observes that considerable 
effort has been undertaken within the National 
Space Council and across a multitude of government 
offices, committees and advisory groups to develop a 
comprehensive and implenientable commercial space 
policy. Parts of such a policy already are in place as 
guidelines to supplement the broad commercial 
space charge given NASA in the revised Space Act. 
However, the federal government is still by far the 
major consumer of space products and services, and 
will continue to be a highly significant, if not 
dominant, consumer for many years to conic. 
Given the above, the Committee would empha-
size the importance of the U.S. Government 
following as closely as practicable the model 
established by the NACA/NASA successes in the 
aeronautics industry in order to encourage the 
fullest commercial use of space. Examples 
wherein further government actions can be 
helpful include ensuring that procurements are 
based on "best value" rather than lowest cost; on 
the related experience and past performance of 
the contractor; on functional requirements, not 
on detailed design specifications; on accepting, 
whenever appropriate, commercial production 
and quality assurance standards and techniques; 
and on using commercially offered space prod-
ucts and services whenever possible. Of particu-
lar importance is that in its commercial contract-
ing, the government recognize the need for 
credible long-term contracts. (Item J.) 
Finally, the Committee notes that commercial 
space policies have undergone substantial change 
every two 'ears since 1982, and even newer policies 
are currentl y being promulgated. Significant 
additional private investments are not likely to be 
made in commercial space ventures until these
policies become stable, and are perceived b y those 
making investment decisions as likely to remain 
stable. 
International Programs, Various elements of the 
U.S. civil space program have for a number of years 
involved the participation of international partners. 
In the case of the science program, collaborative 
efforts have included instrument design and con-
struction, the interpretation of data, and the provi-
sion of entire instruments by
 groups of interested 
individuals. 
On a larger scale, international collaboration 
now involves teaming arrangements including 
international partnerships where portions of robotic 
spacecraft or even entire spacecraft, are involved. In 
the case of the manned space program, scientists 
from several nations participated in the design of 
some of the instruments placed on the Moon in the 
Apollo program. The Apollo/Soyuz linkage in space 
in 1975 was a high point for the U.S. in cooperative 
endeavors with another country , in this case, the 
Soviet Union. International participation in manned 
space flight activities has continued in the Space 
Shuttle era, involving the provision of hardware and 
flights of foreign astronauts. 
In a 1988 report to the President-elect, the 
National Academies of Sciences and Engineering 
noted that "partnerships with other nations and 
organizations can serve to demonstrate leadership, to 
forge productive relationships and to broaden the 
range of available opportunities, but only if interna-
tional commitments are made carefully and honored 
fully ." This report further advised that when 
collaborative arrangements are contemplated, they 
be "supported at the highest possible levels in the 
participating governments, with as much breadth as 
is feasible." 
We, too, would advise that, prior to entering 
into international arrangements, especially for the 
necessarily
 large human exploration program, the 
government first determine its own goals and 
expectations. Once undertaken, a commitment 
should become exactly that. Thus, it is probably not 
prudent, in a longer-term prograni such as human 
exploration of space, to establish international 
agreements for the development of in-line critical 
program elements. It would also probabl y
 not be 
prudent for the U.S. to establish international 
agreements for program elements that would result 
in the permanent loss of critical national technical 
capabilities. Nonetheless, we believe that interna-
tional cooperation should and will become an 
increasingly
 important aspect of future space activi-
ties, particularl y
 in support of such missions as 
environmental monitoring and weather prediction.
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Personnel Resources 
NASA today employs approximately 24,000 
civil servants, and has grown only modestly over the 
past five years. NASA's government employees are 
supported by some 41,000 support services con-
tractors, and their numbers have grown substantially 
in the past three years. 
For the nation to undertake the challenging and 
aggressive space program set forth by the President, 
it will require NASA and its supporting organiza-
tional elements to recruit and retain an adequate 
share of the nation's very best technical and mana-
gerial talent. In the past, the Apollo and early Space 
Shuttle pursuits oflered the excitement needed to 
attract many such individuals. As we look to the 
future, however, the Committee is deepl y con- 
cerned over NASA's ability to continue to attract 
such people. There arc several reasons for this 
situation. 
First, the restrictions of the civil service com-
pensation system are not likely to permit NASA to 
be competitive with the private sector in recruiting 
and retaining the highest quality personnel in the 
decade ahead. As a specific example, since the 
beginning of the program in August 1984, there 
have been five different Associate Administrators for 
Space Station and five different Space Station 
Program Directors. Current civil service regulations 
on base pay, pay raise schedules, relocation costs, 
bonus opportunities and "dual compensation" all 
constrain NASA's ability to compete for talent. 
In the case of new college graduates, private 
industry is able to pay some $5,000 to $10,000 
more per vcar than is NASA, especiall y in high cost-
of-living areas	 and that gap has been widening. 
The problem is particularly acute in the science and 
engineering disciplines where the number of college 
graduates is expected to decline by some 25 percent 
over the next decade. 
A 1989 study of the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
indicated that federal employee salaries were, on 
average, 28.6 percent below those of the private 
sector. In an unpublished NASA studs' of compen-
sation, it was shown that the Director of a major 
NASA center was paid about one-half as much as a 
person with equivalent responsibilities in industry. 
At higher levels the disparit y is even greater. 
Second, recent post-employment restrictions on 
individuals	 and particularl y the future uncertainty 
of those restrictions and their interpretation 	 have
been a deterrent to the recruitment of talented 
technical and managerial personnel into NASA. 
Key managers with extensive industrial experience in 
technical programs are particularly reluctant to
commit to government service in areas where their 
talent could he effectivel y and immediately utilized 
again because of concern over post-government 
eniplovmcnt restrictions. These restrictions were, of 
course, imposed to preclude possible conflicts of 
interest, but have been found extremel y difficult to 
draft with precision and balance. Last year, five 
individuals from industry were approached concern-
ing one key executive level position at NASA. All 
declined, priniarilv because of inadequate compensa-
tion and post-employment restrictions. A similar 
effect has been noted in recent cases where extraor-
dinarily talented NASA employees have elected to 
terminate their government service. 
These two problems will he partially offset in 
the future if the Executive and Legislative Branches 
arc perceived to have jointl y committed to an 
ambitious and challenging long-term space pro-
gram. But it is our opinion that, although abso-
lutclv essential, such a program alone is not enough 
to attract and keep the talent needed. In fact, with 
the declining pool of available technical talent and 
the expanding gap between federal and private 
salaries, it is not at all clear that NASA will be able 
to meet the future challenges of an ambitious space 
program unless deliberate actions are taken now to 
redress the situation. 
We have been somewhat encouraged by the 
recent passage of legislation increasing Executive 
and Senior Executive Service pay levels, and by the 
passage of the Federal Employees Pa' Comparability 
Act of 1990, effecting a degree of long overdue 
reform of the civil service salary system. Once fully 
implemented by the Office of Personnel Manage-
ment (OPM), pay reform will provide base pay 
increases and compensation adjustments based on 
local labor costs, as well as other incentives such as 
recruitment and relocation bonuses and retention 
allowances. But this positive action may still not be 
sufficient to remedy a situation of the severity that 
now prevails. 
The difficulty of removing civil servants who are 
not performing up-to-standard work creates even 
more acute problems for NASA. Its inability to 
easily and quickly remove non-performers further 
limits its ability to recruit new talent to meet future 
challenges. NASA management needs the addi-
tional flexibility to reward high-performers and 
remove non-performers swiftly . Accordingly, we 
propose 
Recommendation 14: That NASA should be 
designated a "pathfinding" agency for the 
implementation of an advanced personnel 
management system. Under this system the 
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current legislative package would be expanded to 
include "pay for performance;" more flexibility 
in senior executive hiring, evaluation and re-
moval; additional cost reimbursement for reloca-
tion; and a capability for handling extended 
temporary duty costs. NASA management 
should propose to OPM the personnel package it 
deems appropriate in the above regards. 
Another human resources concern relates to the 
expected future reduction of experienced managerial 
talent at NASA. Toda y, a very large number of 
personnel are relativel y new to the agency (Figure 
16). This is illustrated by the "bimodal" age 
distribution of NASA employees (Figure 17). 
Within the past ten years the distribution of age and 
experience at NASA has moved from a maximum 
share appearing within the age brackets of 35 to 50 
years to maximum occurring at 25-29 years and 45-54 
years. While it is encouraging that the average age 
of NASA employees is decreasing, it is of concern to 
the Committee that the pool of talent in the 35-49 
year bracket, from which future senior managers arc 
usuall y drawn, is decreasing significantly.
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Based on historical attrition rates, NASA will 
lose over half of its senior-level managers in the next 
S to 10 years. Not only must the Executive and 
Legislative Branches address the total compensation 
system to recruit and retain talent to fill these and 
other key positions, it must also ensure that ad-
equate resources are provided for career develop-
ment of individuals already within NASA, not only 
to increase the size of the talent pool, but also to 
grow the capabilities of persons in the pool so that 
they may compete most eflectivel y for increased 
responsibilities. 
The Space Act of 1958 provided NASA with 
flexibility to hire up to 425 "critical-position" 
personnel, but NASA has not in recent years fully 
utilized this flexibility . The Office of Personnel 
Management also has the authorin' to allocate an 
additional 800 "critical-skills" personnel to various 
government agencies, and NASA should ensure that 
it receives an appropriate share of these positions. In 
addition, OPM has recentl y increased NASA's 
authority to hire special non-manager "Scientific and 
Technical" personnel at more competitive salaries. 
These all are steps in the right direction 	 although 
impacting only a small fraction of NASA's work 
force. 
A further possibility arises from consideration of 
the arrangement between NASA and the California 
Institute of Technology for management of the Jet 
Propulsion Laboratory . In the Conimittee's opin -
ion, this has provided an enormousl y efflctive means 
of obtaining needed technical expertise unfettered 
by the adverse civil service restrictions. It is a model 
that could have wider application as the U.S. space 
program expands, although its broader use requires 
very careful planning in the transition process. 
Such possibilities lead to 
Recommendation 15: That the Office of Person-
nel Management provide NASA the full flexibil-
ity permitted by law regarding dual compensa-
tion waivers, and that OMB allocate to NASA a 
significant portion of the 800 now approved 
"world-class" positions. NASA also should fully 
utilize the authority granted by the Space Act 
and fill all 425 "critical" personnel positions, 
thus helping redress locality pay inequities that 
will not be alleviated quickly enough by pay 
reform. New legislation should authorize NASA 
broad authority to establish, set the pay of, and 
fill up to 10 percent of its positions with "critical 
skills" appointments. In the event that recent 
and planned civil service reforms do not 
promptly alleviate the shortcomings of the 
NASA personnel system then, NASA should
initiate the process of selectively phasing addi-
tional centers into the Jet Propulsion Laboratory 
model; that is, affiliate them with a university as 
Federally Funded Research and Development 
Centers. 
The ability to recruit and retain an adequate 
share of the nation's best technical and managerial 
talent will determine to a great extent NASA's 
ability to carry out the ambitious civil space program 
herein envisioned over the next thirty years. For 
this reason, the Committee believes it is extremely 
important that NASA management place ver y high 
priority on personnel resources, including innovative 
solutions to the impediments of personnel recruit-
ment, retention, training, replacement, and reward-
ing. To this end, it will be very important for NASA 
management to work ck)selv with the OPM, the 
OMB, and the responsible Congressional Commit-
tees to develop flexible personnel regulations and to 
request appropriate reform measures. The Commit-
tee proposes, therefore 
That an Associate Administrator for Human 
Resources be established at NASA headquarters 
who shall be responsible for the recruitment to 
NASA of persons with critical skills, for ensuring 
that NASA maintain competitive compensation 
and personnel development policies to retain 
such people, and for working with OPM, OMB 
and the Congress on additional reforms to 
remove impediments to the recruitment and 
retention of talented and motivated people. 
(Item K.) 
The Committee notes that current statistics on 
technical and scientific education within this country 
reveal that U.S. high school students are taking 
fewer science and mathematics courses than their 
peers in any advanced nation in the world. Further, 
the number of U.S. college graduates pursuing 
careers in science and engineering has decreased by 
nearly
 50 percent over the past 30 'ears. Because 
NASA must draw heavily upon the engineering 
talents available in the U.S., we applaud NASA's 
active role in helping reverse these trends and 
encourage its continued effort in this regard. 
46
Principal 
Recommendations 
This report offers specific recommendations 
pertaining to civil space goals and program content 
as well as suggestions relating to internal NASA 
management. These are summarized below in four 
primary
 groupings. In order to fulls' implement 
these recommendations and suggestions, the 
support of both the Executive Branch and Legisla-
tive Branch will be needed, and of NASA itself. 
Principal Recommendations 
Concerning Space Goals
Space Shuttle missions be phased over to a new 
unmanned (heavy
 lift) launch vehicle except for 
missions where human involvement is essential or 
other critical national needs dictate (Recommen-
dation 9); 
Space Station Freedom be revamped to emphasize 
life sciences and human space operations, and 
include microgravitv research as appropriate. It 
should he reconfigured to reduce cost and 
complexity ; and the current 90-day time limit on 
redesign should be extended if a thorough 
reassessment is not possible in that period (Rec-
ommendation 6); 
a personnel module he provided, as planned, for 
emergency
 return from Space Station Freedom, 
and that initial provisions be made for two-way 
missions in the event of unavailability
 of the Space 
Shuttle (Recommendation 11).
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It is recommended that the United States' 
future civil space program consist of a balanced set 
of five principal elements: 
• a science program, which enjoys highest priority 
within the civil space program, and is maintained 
at or above the current fraction of the NASA 
budget (Recommendations I and 2); 
• a Mission to Planet Earth (MTPE) focusing on 
environmental measurements (Recommcn - 
dation 3); 
• a Mission from Planet Earth (MFPE), with the 
long-term goal of human exploration of Mars, 
preceded by a modified Space Station which 
emphasizes life sciences, an exploration base on 
the Moon, and robotic precursors to Mars 
(Recommendations 4, 5, 6, and 7); 
• a significantly expanded technology development 
activity, closely coupled to space mission objec-
tives, with particular attention devoted to engines 
(Recommendation 8); 
• a robust space transportation system (Recommen-
dation 9). 
Principal Recommendations 
Concerning Programs 
With regard to program content, it is recommended 
that: 
the strategic plan for science currentl y under 
consideration be implemented (Recommendation 
2); 
a revitalized technology plan he prepared with 
strong input from the mission offices, and that it 
be funded (Recommendation 8);
Principal Recommendations 
Concerning Affordability 
It is recommended that the NASA program be 
structured in scope so as not to exceed a funding 
profile containing approximately 10 percent real 
growth per year throughout the remainder of the 
decade and then remaining at that level, including 
but not limited to the following actions: 
• redesign and reschedule the Space Station Free-
dom to reduce cost and complexity (Recommen-
dation 6); 
• defer or eliminate the planned purchase of

another orbiter (Recommendation 10); 
• place the Mission from Planet Earth on a "go-as-
you-pay" basis, i.e., tailoring the schedule to 
match the availability
 of funds (Recommen-
dation 5). 
Principal Recommendations 
Concerning Management 
With regard to management of the civil space 
program, it is recommended that: 
• an Executive Committee of the Space Council be 
established which includes the Administrator of 
NASA (Recommendation 12); 
• major reforms be made in the civil service regula-
tions as they appl y to specialty
 skills; or, if that is 
not possible, exemptions he granted to NASA for 
at least 10 percent of its employees to operate 
under a tailored personnel system; or, as a final
47
Rt/)O)t oI (/0 
Adi'zson 
( o,j ;;,ztt 
on till. 
1utznc of tJ 
U.S. 
Proanym
alternative, that NASA begin selectively convert-
ing at least some of its centers into universit y -
affiliated Federally Funded Research and Devel-
opment Centers (Recommendations 14 and 15); 
NASA management review the mission of each 
center to consolidate and refocus centers of 
excellence in currently relevant fields with 
minimum overlap among centers (Recommenda-
don 13). 
It is considered by the Committee that the 
internal organization of any institution should be 
the province of, and at the discretion of, those 
bearing ultimate responsibility for the performance 
of that institution. Hence, the following possible 
internal structural changes are offered for the 
consideration of the NASA Administrator: 
• That the current headquarters structure be 
revamped, disestablishing the positions of certain 
existing Associate Administrators in order that: 
- an Associate Administrator for Human Re-
sources be established, whose responsibilities 
include making NASA a "pathfinding" agency 
in acquisition and retention of the highest 
quality personnel for the Federal Government 
(Item K); 
- an Associate Administrator for Exploration be 
established, whose responsibilities include 
robotic and manned exploration of the Moon 
and Mars (Item C); 
- an Associate Administrator for Space Flight 
Operations be established, whose responsibili-
ties include Space Shuttle operations, existing 
expendable launch vehicle operations, and 
tracking and data functions (Item E); 
- an Associate Administrator for Space Flight 
Development be established, whose responsi-
bilities include Space Station Freedom and 
other development projects such as the 
Advanced Solid Rocket Motor and the new 
Heavy Lift Launch Vehicle (Item D); 
• an exceptionall y well-qualified independent cost 
analysis group he attached to headquarters with 
ultimate responsibility for all top-level cost 
estimating including cost estimates provided 
outside of NASA (Item B); 
• a systems concept and analysis group reporting to 
the Administrator of NASA he established as a 
Federally Funded Research and Development 
Center (Item A); 
• multi-center projects be avoided wherever 
possible, but when this is not practical, a strong 
and independent project office reporting to
headquarters be established near the center 
having the principal share of the work for that 
project; and that this project office have a systems 
engineering staff and full budget authority 
(ideally industrial funding,— i.e., funding 
allocations related specificall y to end goals) 
(Iteiii G). 
In summary , we recommend: 
1) Establishing the science program as the highest 
priority element of the civil space program, to he 
maintained at or above the current fraction of the 
budget. 
2) Obtaining exclusions for a portion of NASA's 
employees from existing civil service rules or, 
failing that, beginning a gradual conversion of 
selected centers to Federally Funded Research 
and Development Centers affiliated with universi-
ties, using as a model the Jet Propulsion Labora-
tory. 
3) Redesigning the Space Station Freedom to lessen 
complexity and reduce cost, taking whatever time 
may be required to do this thoroughly and 
innovatively. 
4) Pursuing a Mission from Planet Earth as a 
complement to the Mission to Planet Earth, with 
the former having Mars as its very long-term goal 
but relieved of schedule pressures and pro-

gressing according to the availability of funding. 
5) Reducing our dependence on the Space Shuttle 
by phasing over to a new unmanned heav y lift 
launch vehicle for all but missions requiring 
human presence.
*** 
The Committee would be pleased to meet again 
in perhaps six months should the NASA Administra-
tor so desire, in order to assist in the implementa-
tion process. In the meantime, NASA may wish to 
seek the assistance of its regular outside advisory 
group, the NASA Advisory Council, to provide 
independent and ongoing advice for implementing 
these findings. 
Each of the recommendations herein is sup-
ported unanimously by the members of the Advisory 
Committee on the Future of the U.S. Space Pro-
gram (see Appendix III). 
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man and CEO of the Martin Marietta Corporation. 
He has previously served as the Under Secretary of 
the Army, Assistant Secretary of the Army for 
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Director of Defense Research and Engineering in 
the Office of the Secretary of Defense. He is an 
Honorary Fellow and former President of the 
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
and is a Fellow of the Institute for Electrical and 
Electronic Engineers. He has served as Chairman of 
the Defense Science Board and of the Aeronautics 
Panel of the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board. He 
is the author of several books including one on the 
management of large technical projects and is a 
member of the National Academy of Engineering. 
He currently serves as Vice President of the Boy 
Scouts of America. Mr. Augustine holds Bachelors 
and Masters degrees in aeronautical engineering 
from Princeton University and has three honorary 
doctorate degrees. 
Vice-Chairman: 
Laurel L. Wilkening 1)r. Wilkening is the Provost 
and Vice President for Academic Affairs of the 
University of Washington, where she is also Profes-
sor of Geological Sciences and Adjunct Professor of 
Astronomy . Prior to going to the University of 
Washington, she was Vice President for Research 
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also served as Director of the Lunar and Planetary 
Laboratory there from 1981-1983. As a planetary 
scientist, her areas of research are meteorites, 
asteroids, and comets. The book Comets, which she 
edited in 1982, is a widely used reference on the 
topic. In 1985, President Reagan appointed her 
Vice Chairman of the National Commission on 
Space. Dr. Wilkening earned a Ph.D. in chemistry 
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1970, and a B.A. in chemistry from Reed College, 
Portland, Oregon in 1966.
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Edward C. "Pete" Aldridge, Jr. Mr. Aldridge is 
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this position, Mr. Aldridge was Secretary of the Air 
Force from 1986-1988. He joined the Reagan 
Administration in 1981 as the Under Secretary of 
the Air Force, in which one of his key responsibili-
ties was coordinating the Air Force and national 
security space activities. Mr. Aldridge was in 
astronaut training before the Challenger accident. 
He has held numerous management positions in 
government (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 
Office of Management and Budget) and the aero-
space industry (System Planning Corporation, LTV 
Corp and Douglas Aircraft Co.). Mr. Aldridge was 
an advisor on the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks 
(SALT I) in 1970-72. He holds a B.S. in Aeronau-
tical Engineering from Texas A&M University and 
an M.S. in aeronautical engineering from the 
Georgia Institute of Technology. 
Joseph P. Allen Dr. Allen is currently President, 
Space Industries, Inc., in Houston, Texas. From 
1967 until his employment with the company, Dr. 
Allen served as an astronaut with NASA. His 
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ground support crewman and CAPCOM for Apollo 
15, Apollo 17 and STS-1. He flew as a prime crew 
member on STS-5, the first Shuttle flight to deploy 
cargo in space, and on STS 51-A, the first space 
flight to salvage equipment from space. Dr. Allen 
also served at NASA Headquarters as Assistant 
Administrator for Legislative Affairs from 1975-
1978. He is the author of Entering Space, a per-
sonal account of the space flight experience, and has 
published widely in the fields of science education 
and nuclear physics research. 1)r. Allen received an 
undergraduate degree in mathematics and physics 
from DePauw University and holds Masters and 
Doctorate degrees in physics from Yale University. 
D. James Baker Dr. Baker is President of Joint 
Oceanographic Institutions, Inc. in Washington, 
D.C., and Distinguished Visiting Scientist at the Jet 
Propulsion Laboratory. He is author of Planet 
Earth - The View from Space (Harvard University, 
1990). He is a member of the National Research 
Council Committee on Global Change and the 
Ocean Studies Board, and is an officer of the 
international Joint Scientific Committee for the 
World Climate Research Programme. He has served 
as Chairman of the NRC Panel to Review the Earth 
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a member of the NRC Space Studies Board, the 
NASA Space and Earth Science Advisory Commit-
tee, and the Department of Commerce Committee 
on Commercialization of Landsat. He is President 
of the Oceanography Society and a Fellow of the 
American Association for the Advancement of 
Science. Dr. Baker has published more than 80 
papers on oceanography and space and held posi-
tions at the University of Washington and Harvard 
University. He has a B.S. in physics from Stanford 
University and a Ph.D. in physics from Cornell 
University. 
Edward P. Boland Congressman Roland was 
elected to the U. S. House of Representatives in 
1953 and served continuously through the end of 
the 100th Congress in 1988. lii 1955, he joined 
the Committee on Appropriations and was a mem-
ber of the Independent Offices (now the VA, HUD, 
and Independent Agencies) Su bcoiimittec. In 
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and dealt with several scientific agencies including 
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(formerly the National Advisory Committee on 
Aeronautics), the National Science Foundation, and 
the Office of Science and Technology Policy. He 
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nent Select Committee on Intelligence overseeing 
the budgets of the Central Intelligence Agency, and 
other intelligence related agencies. In 1983, 
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Strategic & Space Systems. Following his govern-
ment service he joined the General Electric Com-
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President Corporate Development and Planning. 
Mr. Fink serves on the Defense Science Board and is 
a former Chairman of the NASA Advisory Council. 
He is a Member of the National Academ y of 
Engineering and was Chairman of the NRC Space 
Applications hoard and its Board on Telecommuni-
cations and Computer Applications. His honors and 
awards include the DOD Distinguished Service 
Award, the NASA Distinguished Public Service 
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Staff, Commanded the Eighth Air Force and the Air 
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Report of the
Advisor,
Committee
on the
Future of the
U.S. Space
Progra in 
51
Report o( the 
Advisor, 
( o;n nhlttet 
on the 
Future oft/it 
U.S. Spin-i 
Pro//rn n
Test Pilot School. He is a Naval Academy graduate 
and holds Masters' Degrees in electrical engineering 
and public administration. 
David T. Kearns Mr. Kearns is Chairman of 
Xerox Corporation, Stamford, Connecticut. Mr. 
Kearns joined Xerox in July 1971 as a corporate vice 
president. In 1972, he became President of the 
Company 's copier/duplicator group. He was 
named Executive Vice President, International 
Operations in 1976. He was named President and 
Chief Operating Officer in 1977 and Chief Execu-
tive Officer in 1982. Mr. Kearns served as Chief 
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tories, and Adjunct Professor of Electrical Engineer-
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NASA missions, and conducts extensive ground-
based and laboratory research on space related 
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Earth Science Advisory Committee and is presently 
Chairman of the Space Studies Board of the Na-
tional Research Council. Elected to the National 
Academy of Engineering and the International 
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American Geophysical Union, the American Physical 
Society, and the American Association for the 
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physics from Harvard.
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International Academy of Astronautics, Orbital 
Sciences Corporation, the Pacific Forum, Quotron 
Systems (Division of Citicorp), and Nike, Inc. He 
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ies), Vice President and Group Executive of the 
Power Generation Group (worldwide ship propul-
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generators), and Senior Vice President for Science 
and Technology (oversight of GE's research and 
development). During the first seven Apollo 
missions from 1968 through 1970, he was Adminis-
trator of NASA. From 1976 to 1982, he was 
President, Chief Operating Officer and Director of 
Northrop Corporation. Dr. Paine also has served as 
a Trustee of Occidental College and Brown Univer-
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Terms of Reference 
Advisory Committee on 
the Future U.S. Space 
Program 
Purpose 
The purpose of the Advisory Committee on the 
Future of the U.S. Space Program is to advise the 
NASA Administrator on overall approaches NASA 
management can use to implement the U. S. Space 
Program for the coming decades.
Membership 
The Committee shall be comprised of approximately 
12 individuals selected for their knowledge of space 
activities and management expertise. Membership 
shall provide as broad a set of experience back-
grounds as practicable. Ex-officio members may be 
added to the Committee upon approval of the 
Administrator of NASA with the concurrence of the 
Committee's Chairman 
Reporting Procedure 
The Committee will operate as an independent 
entity, reporting to the Administrator of NASA, and 
Will submit its findings to the Administrator of 
NASA and, with the Administrator, to the Vice 
President of the United States, in his capacity as 
Chairman of the National Space Council.
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Task Statement 
The Committee shall have a broad charter to: 
• Review the future of the civil space program, 
including both management issues and program 
C011tCilt. 
Assess alternative approaches and make recom-
mendations for implementing future civil space 
goals, including such factors as: 
- Appropriateness of planned activities 
- Organizational balance and structure 
- Adequacy of overall skill base of work force 
- Balance between roles of government and 
private sector 
- Possible contributions by other government 
agencies 
- The need to maintain a strong R&1) capabil-
ity 
Assurance of mission success 
Schedule 
The Committee shall report its findings within 120 
days from the date of its inception.
Support 
Administrative support will be provided to the 
Committee by NASA. 
Legal Determination 
Based on the objectives and purposes of the Task 
Force, the NASA General Counsel has determined 
that the activities of the Task Force fall within the 
scope of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 
USC APP 1 et seq.). It is neither intended nor 
anticipated that any of the Board's activities will 
concern "particular matters" within the meaning of 
Section 208 of Title 18, U.S. Code.
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Some members of the Committee, through 
on the their private employment, have interests in the 
Future of the aerospace community and consequently the 
activities of NASA. This factor was taken into 
U.S. Space serious consideration when they were appointed to 
the Committee and, pursuant to applicable laws, it 
Program was determined that the need for the individuals' 
services outweighed the potential for a conflict of 
interest. It was the further determination of the 
appointing authority that the private interests of the 
individuals appointed to the Committee were not so 
paramount as to impede their objectivity or integrity 
as members of the Committee. These determina-
tions were made by the appointing authority only 
after coordinating with the Office of Government 
Ethics to ensure full compliance with existing laws 
and regulations regarding the avoidance of conflicts 
of interest. A government attorney sat in on all 
sessions of the Committee at the request of the 
Committee Chairman. 
In addition, the members of the Committee, 
recognizing there was an important concern as to 
avoiding even the mere appearance of a conflict of 
interest, endeavored throughout their Committee 
activities to minimize, wherever possible, any such 
possible appearance. 
In this regard, because of his role as Chairman 
of the Committee and his position as a senior 
executive with an aerospace company , the Chairman 
of the Committee elected to disqualify himself from 
any decisions as to whether and how the Committee 
would address the issue of a new launch system. 
The deliberations and decisions as to this matter 
were handled by the Vice Chairman.
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